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This technical report was prepared to assist the Office of
Naval Intelligence (ONI) assess the implications of the shift in
national security and national military planning from its previ-
ous focus on the Soviet Union and a European-centered global
conventional war to a regionally-focused set of scenarios and
strategy. The basic starting points for this study were the
various authoritative documents outlining America's new national
security and national military strategy and the July 1992 Strate-
gic Planning for the Office of Naval Intelligence: Vision and
Direction for the Future issued by the Director of Naval Intel-
ligence (DNI).
The authors, military officers enrolled at the Naval Post-
graduate School (NPS), worked collectively and under the super-
vision of a faculty member from the National Security Affairs
Department during the Spring and Summer quarters of 1993. They
had no agenda of favoring one type of intelligence or another,
one service, jointness, or intelligence produced by the Depart-
ment of Defense or non-military agencies. Indeed, the authors
attempted to approach the issues addressed herein with an open
mind without prejudice or preconceptions. The student contribu-
tors were primarily Navy intelligence and unrestricted line
officers enrolled in the intelligence program at NPS. Two of the
officers were from other services -- Air Force and Marine Corps.
The sole direction given to the authors was to look at the
new regionally-focused national military strategy and the initial
thoughts of the DNI, as contained in his vision statement, and to
then consider some of the ideas that were briefed to the class by
one of the ONI senior staff members. This ONI briefing centered
around recent shifts in intelligence emphasis, as defined in the
Washington arena, and dealing with proliferation as a
vendor/client problem.
The product of the efforts by these students is expected to
be discussed and debated by the readers to whom this technical
report has been sent. The report should be read as commentary on
these subjects by individuals "outside of the beltway" who were
asked to review certain concepts without knowledge of existing
government-wide programs to implement them.
This report is but one of the many first steps taken by NPS
to make its Intelligence curriculum more relevant under today's
changed international security environment. The report will also
be used as the basis for a follow-on course with a new group of
students in the Winter quarter 1993. That course will attempt to
further develop certain of the concepts contained herein.
Perhaps the basic message contained in this report is that
the role of military intelligence, and therefore the education of
military intelligence specialists, needs to change. Just as the
new national security strategy no longer equates military with
security, the role of intelligence has now shifted to similar
iii
non-military concerns. Such a wholesale shift in thinking within
any bureaucracy will not come easy and the reader is especially
urged to consider the last chapter addressing this issue.
The report opens with a consideration of the changed world
with its new requirements for strategic intelligence. This
introduction set the stage for obvious follow-on discussions such
as the obvious need for new programming and operational war plan-
ning scenarios. Military intelligence will need to shift its
focus to new areas which in turn requires new specialists with
new areas of expertise. New scenarios for future involvement of
the armed forces should not be viewed as predictive but should
also be used to explore alternative futures and should equally be
used to shape the new world with the use of games, etc., that
focus on tha new scenarios.
For military intelligence, the ultimate problem remains
surprise. In today's international security environment, the
pace of change is so rapid, the spectrum of threat so wide, and
intentions simply too hard to ascertain that it may force the
intelligence community to focus on capabilities, military poten-
tial capability, and above all since we cannot do it all, we will
need to prioritize and concentrate resources where they are most
needed.
One such place to provide more emphasis is on long-range
strategic-level intelligence. Rather than continuing to use the
inductive approach, which focuses on the specific and builds
theory, intelligence may need to return to the deductive ap-
proach. Building theory first and then looking for specifics may
be the only way to handle the multitude of threats facing our
country. One such approach would be to concentrate on general
knowledge about the population, geography, economics, technology
for military potential capability for the other nations of the
world. From this broad overview of all the world's nations, we
can select those more likely to get involved with the use of
armed forces or other instruments of national power that are now
of interest to the military intelligence community.
Likewise, the focus on military technology and proliferation
must be done in a new way. Essentially, this process involves
the identification of countries bent on acquiring technologies or
capabilities that are of interest to military intelligence. Part
of that process will be to understand how much they can afford by
an analysis of their economic forecast and how much surplus
capital they are expected to have. Equally important is what
technologies they can internalize and absorb. The macro-level
analysis of population, etc. described above, therefore, is an
integral part of this process. The next step will be to identify
what hardware, technologies, etc., are available on the market-
place. The government will need to develop sources for this
economic information rather than to deal with fielded hardware or
items in transit. Much of this approach is not new and the
government already has ongoing programs to provide such informa-
tion. The authors of this report validate the concept of shift-
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ing to such a vendor/client approach rather than the more tradi-
tional ways of doing business by the military intelligence com-
munity.
There are other more specific implications for operational
and tactical-level intelligence, of which the authors only devel-
op one as an example. The specific example considered was that
targeting critical nodes vice obvious military target may yield
higher payoffs in military operations. There are the obvious
difficulties in being able to do this that have been well devel-
oped in the nuclear targeting literature and were demonstrated in
Operation DESERT STORM. The authors also felt that in the cur-
rent international security environment, that tactical-level
intelligence may have a high level of payoff for resources devot-
ed. Operational and tactical-level intelligence was not the
primary focus of this study and these recommendations should be
used as an input for further more detailed research.
Any consideration of changing the future direction of a
large organization, such as the intelligence community, will
logically lead to consideration of bureaucratic changes as well.
The authors felt that there were no simple organizational quick
fixes to the problems facing the military intelligence community.
They agreed that we should build on what we already have and do
instead of attempting to "reinvent the wheel." After a detailed
analysis, the authors felt that reorganization of the intel-
ligence community was not the answer, but may be part of an
answer. They agreed that having multiple (perhaps even redund-
ant] opinions remains a good idea but that the various parts of
the community could do a better job in cooperating. A specific
example rif this is the recommendation for better sharing of
foreigr material exploitation. Similarly, there seems to be a
greater need for the intelligence community to work with policy
until such time as the nation's new role in the world has been
fully articulated.
As far as the substance of military intelligence, the au-
thors of this report saw great value in human intelligence and
recognized the long lead times that are necessary for developing
these sources. They also looked at open source intelligence.
The authors conclude that open source intelligence can provide
good information for our country.
The report ends with a discussion of what the authors felt
was the real issue facing the intelligence community: is strate-
gic planning for intelligence, not intelligence in support of
strategic planning. Simply put, having a plan to conduct intel-
ligence in the new international security environment is not
enough. A strategic management plan is also needed by the vari-
ous headquarters.
First, the intelligence community needs to accept the view
that change is necessary. This is not a given; indeed there are
many that would argue that military intelligence already knows
what is all about and does not need the outside interference from
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non-specialists. The DNI's vision statement disputes such a
view. Anyone who looks at the missions for ONI as articulated in
this visions statement must clearly see that the definition of
what is of interest to Washington has been expanded widely and
does not closely resemble what was the routine province of naval
intelligence before the end of the Cold War.
The development the new idea (what military intelligence is
all about) is a separate function from the recognition of the
need for change or the "selling" of the new idea. For the pur-
poses of this study, it did not matter what the new idea was,
only that there is a separate need for its execution. Previous
models for implementing innovation in the armed forces demon-
strate that change can come about from within, as well as it can
be forced upon the military by external forces. Clearly the
current reform effort that this group was asked to consider is an
example of an attempt to change from within.
An implementation plan will need to be created and the
"selling" of the Navy's Maritime Strategy or the Strategic De-
fense Initiative are two of many possible examples to consider
and learn from. In addition to the plan to implement the changes
will be the need to monitor the plan to see how well it is doing.
The execution planners will therefore need to articulate how they
will know that their new ideas have been accepted and what are
the appropriate measures of effectiveness that they will monitor.
The authors also considered impediments to change. First
and foremost is the residual Cold War mindset. It is more than
just still believing in your heart that the Russians are the
enemy, it is also the fact that the careers of the leadership of
the intelligence community has been primarily drawn from those
who cut their teeth on the Soviet threat. How to change civilian
merchant ship specialists from someone who worried about the
military utility of a ship from its photograph to someone who is
concerned with the monitoring of seaborne containers has yet to
be settled.
Equally important is the European focus of the intelligence
community. In this case, it may be easier for the intelligence
community to change than it is for the policy world. Despite
years of analysis that shows that America's interests lie to the/ Orient, particularly in the People's Republic of China, rather
than in Europe, our latest articulations of national security
remain Eurocentric. The intelligence community can lead the way
by developing the products necessary for decision-makers to
understand the global shifts that have yet to be internalized by
the policy side. Traditionally military intelligence has focused
on worst case threat assessments vice the types of "softer"
issues discussed in this report. Such a change will be a cultur-
al change for the intelligence community.
Until such time as the present government publishes the
v results of their "bottom-up" defense review, the lack of agree-
ment by all parties to the nation's new role in world and the
vi
national security strategy to be pursued will use used by detrac-
tors that will continue to point to Russia's theoretical military
capability and argue that monitoring this, like we used to, is
the proper role for military intelligence. The authors agree that
at a time of such change in the world and the community, budget
and personnel cuts are the last thing that is needed. Indeed,
the retraining costs alone are enormous and should be met with
additional resources as our own military capability is reduced.
Finally, the opinions and assertions contained herein repre-
sent the views of the authors and should not be construed as the
views of the U.S. government, the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps,
or the Naval Postgraduate School. This report is not reflective
of any government policies or programs and was simply prepared to
assist the sponsor of the NPS Intelligence curriculum in whatever




The probable scenarios for future wars, and the manner in which they will
be waged have undergone radical change in the last few years. There are two
elements to the major changes in the internaticaal security system. The first is the
collapse of the Soviet Union, and all its incumbent implications. There is no longer
a Warsaw Pact which threatens the security of Western Europe. On the other hand,
a power vacuum and instability have appeared in Central and Eastern Europe. The
second change is a revolution in military-technical affairs. This, in part, was
successfully perceived and incorporated by US strategists into the AirLand Battle
concept, and was also foreseen by Marshal Nilolai V. Ogarkov, former Chief of
the Soviet General Staff. This revolution has changed military theory and military
art in fundamental ways. While there is no longer a realistic short-term threat of a
European-centered global conventional or large-scale nuclear war, high-
technology has given armed forces the ability to conduct strategic operations
with conventional munitions.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, has not made the world a safer
place. The territory of the former Soviet Union has itself become a battleground.
Serious armed clashes have arisen, due in part, to unresolved territorial disputes
and long-standing ethnic hatreds. These have raged in Moldova, South Ossetia,
Abkhazia, and Tadjikistan, etc.. The relationship of Russia with the other republics
of the former Soviet Union has multiple other potential areas of conflict.
Within the Russian Federation, a number of ethnic and political disputes
threaten the Russian Republic, at least within its current borders. The possibility of
a civil war in Russia would have dire consequences for the entire world. A
nuclear armed nation has never undergone a civil war. The military, political,
diplomatic, and ecological dynamics of such a situation are unclear.
The Ukraine has made commitments toward nuclear disarmament, but
deeds have yet to match rhetoric. The Ukraine may yet conclude that it will be
necessary for its own national security to maintain a nuclear deterrent.
Irrespective of any conflict that begins on its former territory, the collapse
of the Soviet Union has completely changed the international scene. As a result the
bi-polar world, has become uni-polar. However, this uni-polar world has every
indication of being transitory. The fear of Soviet hegemony as the justification for
collective security ties with the US has been lost. The US may also be heading into
a period of disengagement from international entanglements. Public opinion is
demanding a renewed emphasis on domestic policy and funding, at the expense of
foreign ties and military preparedness. Regional powers, acting independently, can
be expected to increasingly assert themselves and their own agendas. 1 Therefore,
it is reasonable to expect that a multi-polar international system will be unfolding.
One aspect of the future security scenc may be a renewal of ethnonationalism.
Previously, the aspirations of ethnic n-mnorities for independence or autonomy
were in many cases suppressed due to imperatives of the Cold War, exemplified
by the former Soviet Union itself, as well as the former Yugoslavia.
With the passage of time, it is inevitable that the technology to develop
nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and high-technology weapon
systems will spread. The spectrum of threats has therefore increased. Not only is
there the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass
destruction, but regional powers may s'ee this as a period of geostrategic
opportunity, an opportunity that should be seized. At the low-intensity end of the
conflict spectrum, guerrilla wars and the settling of old ethnic scores are certain to
continue.
The military intelligence community recognizes these changes, and is
adapting collection, analysis and dissemination to reflect the current situation. The
challenges for military intelligence in such a world, are however, multiplied. Not
only are the potential adversaries dramatically increased in number, so are the
types of warfare to be wagcd, the kinds of weaponry to be faced, and ihe varieties
of coalitions that may be assembled as ad hoc allies.
The world is no longer the neatly packaged, bipolar place where cnce the
divided lines were clear, and communism was the main enemy. The fundamental
shift in US national security policy was articulated by the President at the Aspen
Institute, Colorado on August 2, 1990. More recently, "Secretary Les Aspin
testimony to Congress of President Clinton's National Strategy on April 1, 1993."
reiterates that our strategy has shifted from a focus on a global threat to regional
crisis. However, the US and its allies will face different intelligence problems in
the future when responding to a shift in emphasis to -rises and contingencies
instead of global conventional or nuclear war.
In the twenty-first century, the US will continue to seek to preserve its
leading international role and promote a cooperative effort to contain and defeat
various regional threats. The US cannot meet these challenges alone with its
planned significantly reduced force structure. Cooperative regional efforts with
allies or within an ad hoc coalition, will require intelligence cooperation with our
I Edward D. Sheafer, Jr., "Strategic Planning for the Office of Naval Intelligence: Vision
and Direction for the Future," (Washington: Office of Naval Intelligence, July, 1992), p.
7.
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allies, among the national agencies, among the uniformed services, at a new and
higher order---and all this without losing sight of the tailored needs of decision
makers, or the tactical quality of intelligence provided operators.
This paper is the product of a group effort by American military officers
enrolled in a graduate-level program in intelligence at the Naval Postgraduate
School. It hopefully makes some headway in outlining the key strategic changes
impacting national objectives, and in turn, US intelligence objectives; identify
these new intelligence demands; and make some useful policy recommendations,
cognizant of the impediments to implementing these changes. This paper does not
explore all aspects of the intelligence effort, such as covert operations or counter
intelligence, the authors choosing to focus on the broader impact of strategic
redirection.
The Introduction was primarily authored by Navy LCDR Ho-Song Dupont
and LT David Hanson. LT Russ Lindsay was the main contributor for Chapter
One; LCDR Ho-Song Dupont, LT Steve Panchyshyn, LT Tim Gedney and CPT
Peter D. Read USAF for Chapter Two; LT Mark Admiral, LT Stephen Clarke, LT
David Hanson, LT Allison Rosa and CPT Peter D. Read USAF for Chapter Three;
LT Kevin Baker and LCDR Marty Dewing and LCDR Frank Sheehan for Chapter
Four; and CPT Shawn Stith USMC for Chapter Five. However, all authors
zontributed throughout the paper. Overall editing was done by LT Jon A. Skinner
and Professor James Tritten with the technical support of LCDR Terry Hopkins.
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Chapter One
Current Intelligence Structure: Not Business as Usual
I. National Security Refocused: Intelligence Implications
In a statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin stated that the Clinton administration will "apply a new
philosophy to America's defense posture based on a reassessment of the security
dangers we face and on sound strategies for meeting them."1 Secretary Aspin's
comments have far reaching implications for policy makers, planners, and the
intelligence community. A great political debate has been underway since 1990
revolving around the need to redefine our concept of national security. The
revised national security objectives, the resources to be devoted to defense, the
types of threats we face, and the intelligence systems and products needed by our
policy makers and planners to address those threats, will ultimately determine how
best to structure and re-focus US intelligence. The managers of the intelligence
community, in cooperation with the executive branch and Congress, must define
the nature of the Post-Cold War world, America's role in this new world, our
country's interests, and from whence those interests will be threatened. Perhaps
more so than at any point in the past forty years, the intelligence community has
reached a crossroads presenting significant uncertainties.
For more than a half a century, the US has had the luxury of knowing who
its chief adversaries were, having a national consensus on its international security
policy, and having a programming strategy that focused on the worst-case threat.
In many respects the job of the intelligence community was less problematic than
that which we face today. This point is eluded to by Kenneth E. deGraffenreid,
who notes: "Gathering intelligence during the Cold War, while taxing, was at least
straightforward in mission and purpose."2  The US focus on the threat of
international communism for the past four decades came to approach that of an
obsession. Bobby Inman, a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), was quoted to say that being good at "conducting operations
against the Soviets was the fastest ticket to the top of US intelligence services."3
-, Many of the nations top intelligence officials and policy advisors made their
reputations as Soviet experts, and still many more spent portions of their careers
I Aspin, Les, Secretary of Defense, "Statement of Secretary of Defense Les Aspin Before
the Senate Armed Services Committee in Connection with the Clinton Defense Plan,"
(April 1993), P. 1.
2 deGraffenreid, Kenneth E, "Intelligence Threat Changes Require Sharp U. S. Actions,"
Signal 45 (December 1990), p. 67.
3 Johnson, Loch K., "Smart Intelligence, " Foreign Policy (Winter 1992-1993), p. 53.
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dealing with Soviet-related issues. But as Loch K. Johnson observes: "Gone are
the days when 60 per cent of America's strategic intelligence resources were
targeted against the USSR .... "4
According to Samuel P. Huntington, American strategists have traditionally
been concerned with "relatively narrow and highly technical issues: the merits of
particular weapons systems, the minutiae of arms-control proposals and
methodologies for estimating the European military balance."5 Paula L. Scalingi,
a professional staff member of the US House of Representatives Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, further notes that "collection and analysis on
technologies, weapons development and monitoring, nonproliferation, and
economic analysis were...skewed in the Soviet's direction."6 Because Cold War
threats were relatively static and focused, the intelligence effort was reasonably
successful in developing a capability to provide strategic warning. The indicators
previously used by intelligence analysts, however, will not address today's
emerging threats. Therefore, the intelligence community must reassess the types
and sources of data needed as well as the expertise or specialization required.
The difficult job now faced by the intelligence community is evident from
the observation of Samuel P. Huntington: "All in all, the emerging world is likely
to lack the clarity and stability of the Cold War and to be a more jungle-like world
of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities.'"7
The types of threats and challenges to be faced in the new world will place new
requirements and demands on intelligence collection, processing, analysis, and
dissemination; as well as on intelligence personnel and management.
H. Refocusing Intelligence: Issues and Concerns
In response to the newly emerging challenges brought about by the collapse
of communism, intelligence officials have begun to call for the US to adjust its
approach to intelligence and security. Pivotal to this process is the need to
establish a clear understanding of intelligence requirements and priorities. Robert
Gates captures the critical nature of the relationship between those who produce
intelligence and those who consume. Gates believes that "unless intelligence
officers are down in the trenches with the policy makers, understand the issues,
and know what US objectives are, how the process works, and who the people are,
4 Ibid, p. 54.
5 Huntington, Samual P., "America's Changing Strategic Interests," Survival 33
(January/February 1991), p. 3.
6 Scalingi, Paula L., "US Intelligence in an Age of Uncertainty: Refocusing to meet the
Challenge," The Washington Quarterly 15 (Winter 1992), p. 148.
7 Huntington, p. 7.
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they cannot possibly provide either relevant or timely intelligence that will
contribute to better informed decisions.- 8 Intelligence personnel must fully
understand the requirements of those whom they support. The very nature of
foreign policy, and the inherent high costs of mistakes, has placed a tremendous
value on accurate, relevant, and timely intelligence concerning the potential threats
to our country's interests. History has demonstrated that the US can not afford to
act only when crisis is upon it.
Some intelligence officials have suggested that the scope of potential threats
facing the US in the newly fragmented world order will warrant at least the same
level of support, i.e., funding, personnel, etc., as did the Cold War. But some
legislators have expressed concern over the track record of America's intelligence
apparatus during the Cold War, questioning whether support can be justified. The
CIA, for example, was sharply criticized for not predicting the demise of the
USSR.
Another oft-referenced intelligence shortfall occurred between 1975 and
1978. In the face of substantial evidence of a Soviet strategic weapons building
program, the intelligence community repeatedly underestimated the significance of
what was taking place. 9 "The nation," writes Daniel 0. Graham, "has the right to
expect more than that from its intelligence analysts working in concert on an issue
of vital importance." 10 Congressional oversight committees may express similar
sentiments as they seek to determine the future size, role, and structure of
America's intelligence community. A more recent event which has left a significant
impression on both Congress and the media was the Iraqi military's invasion of
Kuwait.
The overriding lesson is that policy makers will continue to expect timely
and unambiguous predictions of events that could threaten US national security
interests. More importantly, though, policy makers, planners, and intelligence
officials must recognize that the traditional notion of the threat to US national
security, and the means by which the intelligence community anticipates or detects
those threats, is by many accounts in a revolutionary state of change.
8 Robert Gates, "Discussion," in Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the
1990s: Collection, Analysis, Counterintelligence, and Covert Action (Washington D. C.:
National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1989), p. 111.
9 Daniel 0. Graham, "Quality of US Intelligence," in Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence
Requirements for the 1980's: Elements of Intelligence, Revised Edition (Washington D.C.:
National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1983), p. 22.
10 Ibid, p. 22.
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In the new world order, intelligence services must continue to provide
timely predictions of events that could threaten US security, including the
identification of impending crisis or conflict. The problem today, though, has
become infinitely more complex than the recent past. LTG James R. Clapper, Jr.,
USAF, the 10th director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), addressed the
new challenge to intelligence, stating that "this is a period of intense and most
profound change,...we have taken very healthy reductions in resources that were
devoted to the former Soviet Union." 11 LTG Clapper continued, "I only wish that
they had been accompanied by a concomitant reduction in the number of questions
and requirements that still continue to be levied on us ..... , 12 The relative stability
of a bi-polar standoff between superpowers has given way to a multitude of new
concerns; including economic, technological, ethnic, and even environmental
issues. For example, traditionally cooperative relationships wiuh some US allies
may take a new form as economic competition becomes more intense. Not only
must US government secrets be protected, but equally vital strategic information
from the private economy. In dealing with such concerns, intelligence agencies
and non-government groups working together may exceed the effectiveness of
either one working alone. In view of the unique intelligence requirements that are
only now beginning to be realized, innovative problem-solving concepts within
the intelligence field must be put forward. New forums for discussion and
coordination must be established to bring together the intelligence community with
its counterparts in industry, academia, and others of the private sector. It is
apparent that the demands placed on intelligence have not diminished with the
folding of communism.
Today, intelligence personnel must be able to identify emerging sources of
power, signs of instability, and a diverse array of regional and functional topics.
Accordingly, the community must have clear guidance on US security objectives,
capable technical resources, appropriate analytical methodologies, and quite
possibly, consider developing a new breed of analyst. Les Aspin, in his statement
before Congress, said the following:
Beginning with [fiscal year] 1994, defense budgets will stress
initiatives and strategies to meet four dangers that stand out in the
security environment that has emerged since the end of the Cold
War and the collapse of the Soviet Union: regional threats to US
I 1 No author listed, "Defense Intelligence Rigs for Varied Global Roles," Signal 46
(August 1992), p. 35.
12 Ibid.
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interests; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the
possible failure of democratic reforms, especially in the former
Soviet world; and continued poor economic performance at
home. 13
The redefinition of national security will undoubtedly have both direct and
indirect effects on intelligence, in terms of focus, budget, and expansion.
Nevertheless, the uncertainty of the current global environment will demand a
strong intelligence capability. It is just such uncertainty that will plague
intelligence officers as they attempt to stay ahead of the world's unfolding
developments. Even though the new environment presents many significant
challenges, the ultimate problem for intelligence officers will remain surprise.
The pace of change is so rapid, and the spectrum of potential threats is so great,
even sophisticated intelligence means are susceptible to surprise. As a result, the
community must place more emphasis on long-range analysis to better
anticipate sources of possible tension or conflict.
The ability of the US to effectively meet the intelligence needs of the post-
Cold War world cannot be resolved by simply shifting analysts to economic or
technology issues. Rep. Dave McCurdy (D-OK), expressed concern over this issue
in 1992. McCurdy commented, "if your focus has been on the Soviet military
capability,...it is going to take a different kind of analyst who understands
technology trends in the Asian Rim or Europe or elsewhere." 14 McCurdy
concluded by adding: "The intelligence community will need a lot of help." 15
HI. Intelligence Looks Ahead
Intelligence managers have begun to reassess the way they do business in
light of the Post-Cold War world. The national intelligence community--CIA,
DIA, and NSA--has started to revise their programs and requirements. The
military has also taken steps to consolidate and coordinate their collection and
analytical operations. The Department of Defense (DOD) has initiated a program
that streamlines defens, intelligence programs and promotes joint cooperation.
While the changes currently being implemented in the intelligence community are
designed to address the needs of '• emerging new world order, the challenges
placed on intelligence collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination, remain
formidable. 16
13 Aspin, p. 1.
14 Williams, Robert H. "Congress Reserves Option," S'gnal 46 (August 1992), p. 33.15 Ibid.
16 Scalingi, p. 150.
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America's intelligence effort has shifted away from the Cold War
monolithic challenge posed by the Soviet Union, to the potentially greater
intelligence tasks associated with numerous and fragmented regional concerns.
William H. Webster believes that "intelligence gathered on the Third World now
has an impact that extends beyond the borders of a single region, and it calls for
knowledge and understanding that transcends a single discipline." 17 "Thus," says
Webster, "it is not surprising that we are interested in both the political and the
economic stability of countries in all regions of the world." 18
While most agree that a strong intelligence capability is a necessity, a more
fiscally conscious Congress may seek to draw down the intelligence organizations,
and curtail the acquisition of new assets, to offset the unprecedented buildup of the
1980s.
The challenges that lay ahead for the community are formidable, but
not insurmountable: new threats (and perhaps some overlooked or neglected
threats), potential domestic constraints, and traditional turf rivalries among
competing intelligence agencies---to name a few. What is needed today is a
clear vision of America's security interests and the intelligence needs of policy-
makers and planners. It is conceivable that intelligence requirements may soon be
expanded to include some selected needs of our allies or international
organizations, further complicating the challenges and responsibilities of US
supporting organizations and analysts. The intelligence community must pursue
aggressive and innovative solutions to deal with the multi-faceted and fluid nature
of the Post-Cold War world.
17 Webster, William H., "The Intelligence Community's Mission in Today's World,"
Signal 44 (September 1989), p. 38.18 Ibid.
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Chapter Two
Rethinking Intelligence for a New Era
I. Drivers of a New World Order
The recent collapse of the Soviet Union has required the US military to
review its strategic objectives, operational and tactical concepts, and supporting
intelligence operations. We can no longer afford to concentrate our efforts against
one or two countries. Throughout the world, the proliferation and use of highly
sophisticated and capable platforms and systems has risen dramatically. In the last
twenty years, several nations have not only sold these newly developed weapon
systems to Third World countries, but have also provided them the technological
capability to create their own indigenous weapons programs.
It is also apparent that the US and the world economy have become
interdependent. The export-oriented world economic environment, and
competition among the United States and its allies for markets will set the stage for
the proliferation of advanced civilian and military technologies to Third World
countries. Additionally, Russia's willingness to sell their over-stocked weapons
and military technology is certain to contribute to the increasing difficulties
military intelligence will face in the twenty-first century.
A. A New Strategic Focus
According to Chairman ot the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Colin L.
Powell, the two emerging realities that have prompted the new national security
strategy are the end of the Cold War and declining defense budgets. General
Powell identifies a number of enduring and emerging realities addressed by the
new strategy: persistent Soviet military power; vital interests across the Atlantic, in
both Europe and the Middle East, the Pacific, and the unknown threat---the crisis
that no one expects. Former President George Bush stated in his August 2, 1990
address in Aspen, Colorado, the foundation of our national defense consists of
forward presence, deterrence, crisis response, and reconstitution. These four basic
pillars of our military strategy are likely to remain in the Twenty-first century. 1
1 Weeks, S., "Crafting a New Maritime Strategy," United States Naval Institute
Proceedings, pp. 30-37, January 1992, p. 32.
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Forward presence will continue to be the key peacetime mission for the US
military as will crisis response and operations with coalition and/or United Nations
(UN) forces. Both forward presence and crisis response missions have traditionally
been a common mode of operation for the Navy and Marine Corps. But some
missions may require more subtle action. Additionally, the reduction in the number
of overseas bases will pose greater challenges for all aspects of overseas
operations in the future.2
From a strategic planning perspective, the United States is redirecting much
of its emphasis away from the Soviet Union and towards regions in the Third
World where countries are acquiring sophisticated war-fighting capabilities. With
the diffusion of potential threats; it is becoming more likely that today's friend may
be tomorrow's enemy. 3 A capable Third World military force poses an especially
significant threat to US forces operating in littoral regions. This threat could be
absolute, i.e., sinking a US naval vessel, or it could be more abstract, constraining
operations simply by its existence.
Involvement in Third World regions will require more complex operational
planning and more demanding execution. If a real or potential Third World
military prevents or frustrates US forward presence, crisis response, or other
missions, our strategic objectives may be jeopardized. The challenge for the US
armed forces in the Twenty-first century, will be to maintain effective and credible
military forces to address and counter instability and uncertainty, with a threat
intensified by the proliferation of weapons and technology in an era of diminished
capabilities.
The cornerstone for regional conflicts in the Third World is sound
intelligence. The US and its allies need the ability to collect, analyze, and
disseminate intelligence to assist coalition and joint mission planners anticipate
future crises. Regional assessments of military capabilities, political, and economic
trends, and the development of effective countermeasures, will be the order of the
day.4
2 Bacon, R.F. , "Submarine Warfare: It's A-Changing," United States Naval Institute
Proceedings, pp. 52-54, June 1992, p. 52.
3 Withers, J.D., "ASW: Considerations for Future Operations in the Third World
Regions," Naval War College, 15 November 1992, p. 2.
4 "Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict," A Report by the Regional Conflict
Working Group to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Washington,
D.C., June 30 1988, p. 56.
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The Office of Naval Intelligence's (ONI), "Strategic Planning for the Office
of Naval Intelligence," July 1992, defines strategic intelligence as early warning of
impending threats, enabling reappraisals for our national interests. Traditionally,
military intelligence has been tailored for individual service's needs. Recent
service intelligence reorganization now provides for diversified Joint Intelligence
Centers (JIC) manned by personnel from all services. Thus, intelligence support
for the theater commanders has changed profoundly in last few years. 5
Thomas B. Grassey points out that the end of the Cold War increases
demands on intelligence, requiring comprehension of each individual nation and
sub national organization on its own terms, rather than as a "superpower client."6
Intelligence products in regional scenarios will likely cost more to produce
because so little can be carried over from the Cold War.
Another likely major focus for US intelligence is treaty verification. A host
of arms-control treaties, bilaterally and multilaterally, on topics ranging from
strategic weapons, chemical warfare, and conventional force levels, i.e.,
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), will heavily task intelligence-related
verification assets. 7
The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), has stated that the
US will have eight-to-ten years warning of a European centered global
conventional war with a resurgent/emergent threat (REGT) on par with the former
Soviet Union.8 Therefore, intelligence assets must also be targeted on the military
and industrial mobilization capabilities, munitions and critical resources, such as
stockpiling, and other similar long-term preparations for war, throughout any area
that would constitute a REGT.9
The role of US intelligence agencies involvement in forecasting the world
economy will likely be much greater. 10 A continued demand on intelligence is the
requirement to understand the internal affairs of Russia and other major republics
5 "Strategic Planning for the Office of Naval Intelligence: Vision and Direction for the
Future," published by Office of Naval Intelligence, July 1992,p. 8-9.6 Tritten,J.J. and Stockton, P.N., Reconstituting America's Defense, Praeger Publishers,
Westport, Connecticut, 1992,p. 32.
7 Ibid, p. 33.
8 Tritten, J.J., Our New National Security Strategy, Praeger Publishers: Westport,
Connecticut, 1992, p. 18.
9 Tritten,JJ. and Stockton, P.N., Reconstituting America's Defense, Praeger Publishers,
Westport, Connecticut, 1992, p. 33.
10 Ibid, p. 34.
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of the former Soviet Union. Given the military capabilities remaining in the region
and the political instability and uncertainty that persist, the fate of those nations
remains a vital intelligence concern to the United States.1 1
Another major concern to intelligence organization in the future will be the
understanding of power of media. Cable television networks, such as Cable News
Network (CNN), which have the capability to produce live reporting throughout
the world are and will increasingly become a valuable source of military
intelligence information. For example, following the June 1993 Tomahawk strike
against Baghdad, President Bill Clinton received notification that the attack had
taken place from CNN and not government sources. 12 This is particularly true for
instant bomb damage assessments and targeting information. At the same time,
how the war is reported, or misreported to the general public can have a significant
effect on military operations.
The movement of states from rigid alliances, the resurgence of ethnic
nationalism, the diminishing of communism as an international political and social
force, and the growing awareness of the economic interdependence of all nations,
co-tributes to uncertainty and instability in identifying friends and potential
adversaries. The enhanced role of the UN, particularly in peacekeeping
operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other non-traditional tasks,
will require closer cooperation and support. The nature of these new demands
underscores the importance of the political role of expeditionary forces designed
for quick response in joint and coalition operations. The Navy's white paper,
...From the Sea, has been formulated to support these type of missions. The Navy
will now tailor battle forces for future conflicts to support joint strike, littoral
warfare, surveillance, space and electronic warfare, strategic deterrence and
strategic sealift. 13
One positive result of the new era in superpower relations is that regional
conflicts can now be treated independently of the old East-West context. The
United States has found Russia and China willing to cooperate to solve regional
conflicts. 14 The emergence of Eastern Europe from communism brings demands
on the US and its allies to ensure that the transition to democracy and capitalism is
as smooth as possible. 15
11 Ibid, p. 34.
12See Ken Auletta "Raiding the Global Village," New Yorker, 69, no. 24 (August 2,
1993):25.
13 "Strategic Planning for the Office of Naval Intelligence: p. 124.
14 Allison, G., Rethinking America's Security, The American Assembly, W.W. Norton &
Company, 1992, p. 178.
15 Abshire, D.M. "Potential Threats to American Security in the Post-Cold War Era,"
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Knowing that today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy, who can the US
trust and cooperate with in the future? The US intelligence communities may have
to share intelligence data with past enemies.
The key to shaping the new security environment of the is ensuring
cooperation and cohesion among the leaders of the world, especially with the
European Community (EC), Japan, China and Russia. Maintenance of peaceful
relations, both public and private, among these nations will allow for a system
designed to allow a future for the common pursuit of multilateral interests. The US
will maintain a military presence overseas to be a part of this framework of
stability.
B. Implications of Smaller Military Forces
The 1991 and January 1993 National Security Strategy of the United States
declares that regional crises along with forward presence will be the primary
determinant of the size and structure of our future military forces. This assumption
is unlikely to change under the Clinton Administration. Another fundamental
component of the new national security strategy is that, assuming an eight-to-ten
year warning of a European-centered global conventional war with an REGT, we
have time to rebuild or reconstitute totally new forces if necessary. Paradoxically,
while the US is relaxing its warning time for a European-centered global
conventional war, required response in many regional scenarios will be more rapid
than before.
The changing security environment makes a US military drawdown
possible. But obviously, there must be a limit, beyond which reductions will
impair US capability for military action to the point where traditional or preferred
security objectives will have to be foregone. This may happen as well. Such a
eventuality will require the intelligence community to assist the process of
prioritizing which are the key threats to re-defined national objectives.
Future US crisis response forces will operate under the umbrella of joint
warfare, and frequently as a part of coalition force---a mixture of small and
tailored forces. Replacing conflict with the Soviet Union with Third World
regional contingencies as the central focus of US military strategy has many
implications. It complicates planning and execution of joint and combined
operations, making it difficult for effective advance planning. Indeed, the US
may return to a family of "Rainbow" plans, typical of the inter-war years. In many
Hearing before the Defense Policy Panel, U.S. Congress, House of the Committee on
Armed Services House of Representatives, December 10, 11, and 13, 1991, p. 5.
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possible scenarios, coalitions will be ad hoc, and although we have assumed host-
nation-support at the operational-level of warfare, access to overseas facilities
may really be unpredictable. Additionally, prospects for significant relief of US
defense burdens by Western nations in these regions will be limited by the
corresponding declining military budgets of our allies, as well as their own
political and domestic policies.
1I. Military Impact of Global Change
As the US enters a new world order, several paramount issues will impact
the effect global change has on military intelligence. Objectives must be defined
and met in a strategic environment which is shifting from a military bi-polar to an
economic multi-polar arena. Stronger national economies will be more capable of
acquiring world markat technology, increasing proliferation and the possibility of
greater regional instability. Moreover, nations with weaker industrial bases are
becoming increasingly able to purchase small numbers of extremely high
technology weapons systems.
In recent years, a greater number of Third World nations are using a large
percentage of national assets for military purchases, fueling possibilities for
regional conflict. The near monopoly once enjoyed by the US DOD's research,
development and acquisition process has fallen behind civilian markets and foreign
competition. As both manpower and available budgets decline, the corresponding
decreased military capability calls for an increase in intelligence efficiency.
A. Economic Interdependence
Nations are increasingly evolving into distinct players in world markets,
and their interaction in these markets, politically, economically, socially, and
militarily, must be analyzed. Related concern; about the US reliance on foreign
technology, energy or capital are really concerns about dependence. 16 But one-
sided dependence examples are rare in international politics. More commonly,
states are interdependent, or mutually dependent. For example, although the US is
dependent on foreign oil supplies, those same supplier nations, as trading partners,
rely on the US for dollars, military equipment, and food stuffs. This
interdependence is rarely equal, and demands trading partners be cognizant of the
ramifications of one another's unilateral actions.
16 Kapstein, E.B. The Political Economy of National Security:A Global Perspective.
New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1992, p. 181.
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Interdependence has two distinct attributes: sensitivity and vulnerability.17
Sensitivity interdependence is an immediate cost suffered by one country as a
result of another country's unilateral action, i.e., the early 1970s oil embargo.
Vulnerability interdependence defines a nations ability to affect another by its
policies, but face the consequence that the affected nation may find alternate
sources of a previously relied upon commodity. In such a cases, it becomes less
likely a nation could blackmail the world economy. 18 But becoming dependent on
a commodity available solely through foreign sources could severely impact trade
issues, aiid possibly, successful national operational capability.
Although it is commonly accepted that the 1991 actions against Iraq by
Coalition Forces were a success, critics contend the likelihood of such a strong
coalition led by the US, without the strategic threat to the Middle East oil reserves,
is low. It also recognized, however, that intervention was influenced by Saddam's
nuclear program, strong ties with Israel and Saudi Arabia, and the illegality of
Saddam's actions.
A key national objective, which will require intelligence support, is the
strengthening of national and international regulations on technology transfer,
without detrimentally affecting our increasingly interdependent global
economy. There is a threat of a return to pre-World War I conditions of fierce
economic rivalries and destabilizing military alliances if insufficient stress is
placed on the cooperation and cohesion of the industrialized nations. 19
Notwithstanding success in the Gulf War, the US must balance the tension
between international needs and economic constraints. These constraints, brought
about by the budget deficit, growing foreign debts, debt service costs, decreased
levels of investment, fragile productivity growth, decreased technological
leadership in cutting-edge industries, and overall general decline in US glbbal
competitiveness, seriously impact the functional abilities of our intelligence
services.2 0 National interests and global obligations could far outrun our available
resources to sustain and/or defend them. Nations remain responsible for the
provision of defense and social welfare, but cannot provide these to their own
people without entering the world economy. 2 1
17 Ibid, p. 182.
18 Ibid, p. 182.
19 Allison, G., Rethinking America's Security. The Americav Assembly, W.W. Norton &
Company, 1992, p. 119.2 0 Ibid, p. 126.
21 Kapstein, p. 199.
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B. Demography and Economic Disparity
The relationships between nations are constantly becoming more and more
complex. Ideological issues which previously raised insurmountable barriers in
interstate relationships, are being surpassed by the greater need for economic
survival. Competition for funds within underdeveloped nations is divided between
domestic social needs and leadership goals for enhancing military inventories.
Governments, particularly authoritarian, often opt for the military priority.
However, it is worth noting that such analysis can not be simplistic, i.e., India
appears to further its national defense capabilities without ill-affecting its
economic status, and may actually aid the development of its industrial sector.2 2
Economic disparity between nations contributes to instability. A basic
criticism by Third World nations is the poverty gap that separates the North from
the South. Recent optimistic growth rates of the Third World economy of 5
percent amiually will do nothing to close this gap, which will likely get worse. The
North-South conflict involves the struggle for world resources and the means to
utilize them. 23 With this gap widening, one can see added economic disparity
increasing global instability. The removal of the great wall between the East
and the West, along with the industrial advances of Asian and other under-
developed countries, lead to a new international economic order for which
there is no blueprint.24
Small nations or territories deemed inconsequential have often been able to
influence powers much greater than their own. Only a decade ago, Iraq possessed
no threat or capability that could have resulted in actions requiring a "Desert
Storm." Ten years later, and after a massive investment in the military, her actions
required the greatest assault from the West since D-Day. In the 1982 Falklands
War, Argentina did not possess a capable and sustained base structure adequate to
combat the British. But Argentina demonstrated its successful utilization of
technology to counter its deficiencies by inflicting damage with the Exocet Air-to-
Surface-Cruise-Missile (ASCM). Small numbers of hi-tech weapon systems can
impact the dominant nation's ability for sea control and power projection,
particularly in littoral regions.
22 Chan, Steve and Alex Mintz, Eds. Defense, welfare, and growth: Perspectives and
Evidence. New York: Routledge, 1992, p. 133.
23 Gear, B.S. Sea Denial Capabilities of Third World Countries, Master's Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Dec. 1982, p. 70.
24 Gibson, David and Raymond W. Smilor, Eds. Technology Transfer in Consortia and
Strategic Alliances. Lanham, MD: Rowen and Littlefield Publishers, 1992, p. 39.
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C. Acceleration of Technological Changes
Technology policy issues range from conceptual advances, research and
development (R&D), production, and testing, to its eventual acquisition, field use,
transfer, etc.. From theoretical conception to hardware use, the fields of
technology are experiencing advancements with exponential acceleration. The
intelligence community is being forced to deal with the strong, positive graphical
relationship of rapid technological advancement and its subsequent proliferation.
Additionally, with the increased call for decreased domestic defense spending,
there will be a greater demand for joint civilian and military technological
ventures, complicating both the dual-use issue as and straining operational
security.
Today, systems designed and produced for non-military use are commonly
used for military purposes, but in the US, are also frequently outdated before they
are introduced on the world market. The latter problem may be improved with a
more efficient and timely R&D, and marketing process. The former, requires more
than monitoring dual-use technology, but demands the creation of an effective
system of regulations and method to properly monitor and hopefully check
proliferation. In a statement by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin before the Senate
Armed Services Committee on April 1, 1993, Secretary Aspin addressed dual-use
technologies and the necessity to emphasize Department of Defense's science and
technology accounts with parallel civilian initiatives, with the goal of promoting
US economic growth. He specifically focuses on high definition systems,
microelectronics, and follow-on defense reinvestment programs. 25
It has been argued that the DOD technology is lagging far behind in what is
presently available on the world market. During the Gulf War, most of the
technology used was developed 10-15 years prior. The lessons of the Persian Gulf
again showed us how critical technology was to national security.26 While this
initiative addresses both the desire to reduce duplicity and decrease spending, it
allows for greater sharing of certain sensitive information with allies, civilian
industry, and foreign markets, a side effect that can hurt security issues,
particularly hardware and systems information. Although there is some implied
security risk with shared developments, a strong civilian/dual-use technological
base is essential to continued leadership in defense technology and national
security.
25 Aspin, Les. "Statement of Secretary Les Aspin Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee in Connection with the Clinton Defense Plan." Washington, D.C. April 1,
1993, p. 7.26 Allison, p. 126.
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In the same address, Secretary Aspin addresses the issue of proliferation.
He states that the US must find innovative approaches on present issues such as
policy, weapons acquisition, export controls, and international political regimes.27
Revisions made by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM) in 1991 complicated matters by releasing close to one-third of the items
on the dual-use industrial list.28 Some advances in this field were presented by
former Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Reginald
Bartholomew before the Arms Control Subcommittee of House Foreign Affairs
Committee on March 24, 1992. Conventional arms sales policies among the US,
Russia, China, Britain, and France were addressed with overall good results
reported. 29 Most notably, areas on responsibility, transparency, and consultation
were discussed and ultimately agreed upon. Concerning responsibility, it was
acknowledged that the aforementioned arms suppliers obligate themselves to
ensure their arms sales do not undermine stability. Transparency will help identify
and avert destabilizing transfers by agreed upon open exchange of information.
Finally, consultation opens the arms transfer decisions to a forum subject to debate
and criticism. This marks a major step in applying collective reasoning among the
five in the realm of arms transfer. Sharing information before the transfer takes
place will do better in countering a weapons sale ultimately used by the country
for offensive vice defensive purposes. 3 0
Many technical issues remain to be solved, most notably basic definitions
of what constitutes a missile, tank, etc.. Secretary Bartholomew mentions that
these policies on arms transfer are the instrument to the end realization of stability.
Arms transfer is a stark reality, what remains to be solved are conditions on
common standards and questions concerning responsible trade, especially to Third
World nations. The goal to ensure this is an effective check/policy, which these
efforts contribute to, in limiting weapon and technology acquisition to legitimate
defensive purposes. 3 1 A basic critical step is to implement a UN-created data base
of existing national assets and capabilities with continual updating of internal and
import acquisitions. A Register of Conventional Arms, implemented January 1,
27 Aspin, Les. "Statement of Secretary Les Aspin Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee in Connection with the Clinton Defense Plan." Washington, D.C. April 1,
1993, p. 3.2 8 Tritten, p. 156.
29 Bartholomew, Reginald. "Conventional Arms Sales Policies of the US, CIS, China,
Britain, and France." The Defense Institue of Security Assistance Management (DISAM)
Journal. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. Vol.14 no.3, Spring 1992, p. 50.30 Ibid, p. 50-54.31 Ibid, p. 54.
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1992, provides a more formal forum for nonproliferation. Although this measure is
completely voluntary for the participating nations, and commits no formal
obligation to report, it does act as a positive confidence building measure towards
more reliable arms control.32
The arms transfer issue involves but a small part in technological transfers
that the intelligence community must face. Transfer and proliferation are
complicated by requisition for training, cooperative research and development,
joint ventures, foreign affiliations, etc.. Additionally, many mediums for such
transfer are included on the spectrum from individual-to-individual, to
government-to-government. Within the spectrum lies private corporation-to-
government, specifically the recent American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T)
decision to modernize China's telephone system.3 3 This joint venture, subject to
approval by US officials who regulate the transfer of technology abroad, is an
example of seemingly innocent capitalism that ultimately involves R&D,
manufacturing practices, training, and other aspects of concept design and
production exposing only part of the shared technology dilemma.
Prior to the global change to an economic multi-polar world, the US
enjoyed an expansive role as the leading developer of critical future technologies,
relative to the most other nations. Technology has given the US unparalleled
economic and military advantages with a high standard of living. After World War
II, the US had the technological advantage over all nations, and most significantly,
the Soviet Union. Policy makers knew that to secure this advantage and preserve
national security, the US must prevent technology concepts from being transferred
unintentionally to other nations. There was a shift, however, in the 1980s from
US-centered technology (particularly electronics) dominance to foreign markets. 34
Unfortunately, the US can no longer claim such a monopoly on these technologies.
Third World nations, either alone or in alliance, such as Indonesia, South Korea,
and Hong Kong, not only have a growing capability to rapidly, cheaply and
massively produce advances, such as in microchip technology, but also represent a
strong, growing industrial base.
For the intelligence community to determine if technological trends and
proliferation constitute a threat, they must identify those countries bent on
acquiring new technologies, how much they can afford to buy, and what
capability they will have to both employ and maintain the assets once
32 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. World Armaments and
Disarmament. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 299-301.
33 Behr, Peter and Daniel Southerland. "AT&T to Modernize China's Telephones."
Washington Post, February 24, 1993, p. 1.34 Allison, p. 119.
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developed/acquired. Additionally, a nations technological development is
dependent on what is presently available on the market, what their particular
economic and technological base comprises, and degree of political stability.
These issues determine greatly the concern and attention intelligence should afford
,iem.
Economic revival and military export success may produce the greatest
threat of all to the West---undermining the relative value of its own military
infrastructure. Stimulating growth through international joint ventures and
international links promotes cooperation and short term stability. A critical issue
is the time it takes for newly-acquired technologies to be applied to the military
sphere.3 5 Since the intelligence communities do not possess the ability to do
everything at once they must develop formal definitions of priorities to monitor
te'hnology transfer issues.
The US intelligence agencies face a complex dilemma as they stand at a
crossroads. Strategic concerns in coping with the collapse of the Soviet Union are
complicated by the economic concerns of a global economy, as well as
exponential advancements in technology both vertically and horizontally; all the
while budgets are shrinking. Military intelligence is being challenged to change its
culture, make-up, and mission.
In the conventional realm, we may divide nations into categories of high,
medium, and low military technology. It must be stressed that a nation does not
have be able to produce weapons of a given level of technology itself. It only has
to be able to afford to purchase and operate the weaponry. It is expected that
technology transfers will increase in the future. The definitions of high-tech, med-
tech, and low-tech countries will be dealt with in greater depth below. At this point
it is sufficient to note that very different forms of war are possible when nations
are equipped with weapons which are qualitatively different.
The changes in military art in our time are largely the result of the latest
revolution in military-technical affairs. Emerging technologies are incorporated in
the new generation of weapons. These weapons include stealth aircraft (and other
low-observable teclH,,ologies); it includes weapons platforms such as Airborne
Warning and Contioi Systems (AWACS), Joint Services Tactical Airborne Radar
System (JSTARS) and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and other long-
range precision-guided munitions.
35 Haglund, David G., Ed. The Defence Industrial Base and the West. New York:
Routledge, 1989, p. 74.
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It appears the effect of such weapons is to tip the scales of the
offense/defense balance in favor of the offense. When the offense is favored so
heavily, an inherently unstable military situation develops; the nation which strikes
first can achieve a crippling initial blow from which the enemy cannot recover.
This encourages potential combatants to have a hair-trigger and to deliver this first
strike whenever a crisis occurs.
High-tech forces, generally speaking, do not require massed field armies to
achieve their striking force. Therefore, mobilization is a relatively quick process,
shortening the warning time for potential adversaries, further complicating the
I&W process of intelligence. The spectacular success of the Gulf War
demonstrated what occurs when a high-tech nation fights a mid-tech nation
without nuclear weapons: its economy can be rapidly crippled, while its army is
systematically destroyed on the field.
Another important consideration is that the categories of high, medium, and
low-technology will not fully describe the nature of war. not only the level of
technology, but also the numbers of systems fielded will be critical. There are
numerous historical examples where a nation mistakenly thought that the offensive
was now favored due to technological advances, only to find its offensive stalled
when these weapons stocks ran low, and as a result, being forced into a war of
attrition. One characteristic of high-technology weapons is that they tend to be
fielded in small numbers. This will especially be true of third-world countries
which may not be able to purchase these weapons in sufficient quantities.
Intelligence organizations will obviously need to, therefore, continue to track raw
numbers. When these limited number of weapons are neutralized (if properly
targeted) or expended, a military will be forced to wage battles at a lower-level of
technology, a level for which it may be ill-prepared.
For intelligence professionals, analysis in support of operational units will
become increasingly complicated. Not only will there be an increase of technology
transfers in general, but it will be necessary to try to determine how these
sophisticated systems will work synergistically with each other. For example, a
surface to air battery may be made up of an acquisition radar from one country,
and fire-control radar from a second, and the actual missile from a third. The
effectiveness of these heterogeneous systems will be much more difficult to assess
than those which have been sold as essentially complete systems.
Yet another area for concern, is the possibility of a new technology
rendering whole aspects of a nation's forces obsolete. Stealth technology is an
example, rendering most radars useless, and has the potential to be repeated again
with various technologies in the future.
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The US intelligence community will be facing a wide spectrum of military
threats in the future. The theaters of war may be new, as may be the types of
weapons and how they are employed. In order to support complex analysis in
which technology plays a key role, the intelligence community must re-focus its
collection efforts. To support higher-order analysis such as targeting, an accurate
database of high-technology equipment must be maintained. This database will
include information on the development of new technologies. It is also essential to
track the transfers of high-technology equipment from the producers to the
consumers. This may take many forms, such as using intergovernmental
cooperation to track the transfers from large producers. Currently, 86% of
international sales of large weapons systems are conducted by five nations: the
US, UK, France, China, and Russia.36 Tracking technology transfers and
development can also be accomplished by defense attaches. There is a wealth of
information available through open sources such as newspapers, trade
publications, academic exchanges, as well as commercial shipping information.
Without the accurate raw data on technology developments and transfers, the
complex analyses which will be required of military intelligence in the future will
simply not be possible.
1. The High Technology Threat of the Future
Future military technologies which would be considered to be a high
technology threat to the US and her allies or coalition partners would include:
advanced submarines capable of delivering cruise missiles, torpedoes, or mines.
These would include the German Type 212, the Russian Improved KILO, the
WALRUS, and advanced designs featuring Air Independent Propulsion (ALP)
systems. Currently shipyards in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Germany, India,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, Turkey, and the UK
are manufacturing conventionally powered submarines which fall into this
category.
Aircraft threats which would be considered as high technology would
include improved Flanker and Fulcrum models and any front line aircraft which
exhibits a limited stealth capability. These aircraft would be able to deliver a wide
36 Michael O'Hanlon, Victoria Farrell, and Steven Glazerman, "Controlling Arms
Transfers to the Middle East: The Case for Supplier Limits," Arms Control Today,
November 1992, p. 19.
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range of ordnance including anti-ship missiles and precision guided (possibly
standoff) munitions. In addition to an offensive capability a high technology threat
must posses some degree of airborne reconnaissance capability. This could
include manned and unmanned vehicles for reconnaissance, targeting, and battle
damage assessment.
Seaborne capabilities would include improved versions of the KRIVAK and
MEKO Frigates. The Track II MEKO Frigates are very capable muiti-mission
platforms with newer models incorporating a combined diesel or gas turbine
(CODOG) propulsion plant instead of combined diesel and diesel (CODAD) and a
variety of anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and anti-
surface warfare (ASUW) offensive and defensive systems. Advanced frigate
designs are currently being produced in Australia, Canada, China, France,
Germany, Greece, India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and the UK.
In addition to multi-mission frigates a high technology threat would likely
operate a ramped vertical takeoff and landing (S/VTOL) carrier. Argentina,
France, India, Spain, and the UK currently have in their inventory or on order
aircraft carriers capable of operating S/VTOL aircraft. Japan is considering
production or purchase of a light carrier although political pressures might require
them to develop an amphibious ship capable of operating S/VTOL aircraft instead.
The flexibility and capabilities provided to a country through the use of relocatable
airfields has been proven many times since 1941.
An adversary of high technological capability would posses land forces
which are built around the doctrine of maneuver warfare. The Gulf War exhibited
to the world how aircraft and highly maneuverable ground forces can decimate a
static land force. Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) will likely remain in the inventories
of future armies, with Soviet T-80 or Abrams M-1A versions being the greatest
threat. Advanced composite armor and gun stabilization systems which allows
shooting on the run will be a necessity. Additionally, long ra.ge self propelled
guns and missile launchers which are able to keep up with the rapid advance of
land campaigns will be highly prized.
Ballistic missiles capable of accurately delivering a variety of payloads will
likewise define a country of high military technological capability. These weapons
will be able to threaten not only point targets on land but also mobile land targets
and ships at sea. Currently the technology exists, on the open market, to allow
countries to give Theater/Tactical Ballistic Missiles (T/TBM) a terminal homing
capability useful against ships at sea. There are currently about 34 countries with
short and intermediate range ballistic missiles in service, with ranges of 70 km to
4750 kIn. Also in addition to the 34 countries with short and intermediate range
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ballistic missiles in service there are 22 countries with the probable capability to
manufacture and export new missiles or components to update and improve
existing systems. Ballistic missiles of intercontinental range are currently only
produced by China, Russia, France and the US. The experience and knowledge of
satellite launch vehicles would likely allow countries such as Japan to design and
build ballistic missiles if they were so inclined.37
Weapons of mass destruction including chemical, biological, and nuclear
would be contained in limited numbers at a minimum in the arsenals of future high
technology adversaries. The restraints exercised by the superpowers in the Cold
War have gone and pressures upon non-nuclear nations to prevent them obtaining
nuclear weapons are now much weaker. Iraq has shown what is possible, even in
the full glare of modern media attention.38
High technology battlefields rely on electro-optical (EO), electromagnetic,
acoustic, infra red (IR), radar, and multispectral images and emissions in order to
transmit information, locate and attack the enemy. Not only must an adversary of
high technology be able to detect electromagnetic emissions but he must be able to
employ countermeasures. Countermeasures can include the ability to employ EO
and IR camouflage, the capability to jam electromagnetic radio and radar links,
and the ability to cause weapons to home in on the emissions of the enemy.
2. The Medium Technology Threat of the Future
Future threats classified as being of medium capability technologically will
likely contain weapons which are today considered front line by most of the world.
These will include: conventional submarines of advanced diesel electric
configuration, including German Type 209 and Russian KILO classes. These
vessels will likely contain improved sensors, weapons systems and possibly
anechoic tiles but will not have AiP propulsion plants.
Aircraft such as the Russian supplied Hanker and Fulcrum and the French
built Mirage 2000 will be considered of medium capability technologically by
2010. These platforms will be capable of delivering air to surface missiles
(ASMs) against ships at sea and precision guided munitions (PGMs) against a
variety of targets. Future air forces within this category will have no capability to
perform reconnaissance.
37 Duncan Lennox, "Missile Race Continues", Janes Defense Weekly, January 23, 1993,
. 20.
8 David Miller, "Nuclear Warfare and Regional Nuclear Powers", International Defense
Review, 9/92, pp. 821-824.
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Medium capability naval forces will likely be built around Frigates such as
the German MEKO class, or small coastal patrol craft sometimes referred to as
corvettes. Their capability to conduct open ocean operations will be severely
limited because of weapons and ship limitations. Also they will not posses a
S/VTOL capability with which to project power.
Land forces will likely be built around current MBTs such as the Russian
T-64/T-72 and towed artillery pieces. Forces will be limited by their inability to
support armored columns on the move with artillery. Theater ballistic missiles will
likely be in the inventory, as will a limited chemical and biological capability. A
nuclear capability will not exist for an adversary of medium technological
capability. Countries within this classification will posses the ability to detect and
exploit electronic warfare (EW) emissions but will not posses the capability to
utilize sophisticated countermeasures.
3. The Low Technology Threat of the Future
Adversaries within this category will be considered to be in the
technological stone-age of capabilities. These countries will likely be of Third
World standing economically, or convinced that they don't face military attack.
The majority of the weapons systems which will be found in this category will
have peaked technologically about 1970. No submarine capability will exist, and
surface ships will be small patrol boats similar to the Soviet OSA. Additionally,
commercial vessels may be converted to increase the size of the fleet although
their utility will be extremely limited. Aircraft will be of US F-5 vintage. These
planes were produced in large number, exported widely, and are agile and capable
in limited engagements. They will be equipped to deliver air to air missiles
(AAMs) and gravity bombs only. Ground forces will be limited to using small
arms, light tanks, and artillery of limited mobility. No ballistic or cruise missile
capability will be in their inventory. The military forces might have the capability
to detect certain electromagnetic emissions of an adversary, however, they will
have no capability to utilize active or passive countermeasures and no capability to
target such emissions.
4. Variants of Threat Levels
Many adversaries in the future are likely to have militarily unbalanced
forces. A country may because of its geography, political culture or indigenous
military industrial capability choose to invest primarily in one military arm and not
in others. Large nations, like Russia, may husband high technology weapons in
one area while using lower technology weapons in others; depending on perceived
threats. Additionally, countries observing the military lessons of others may make
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incorrect assumptions regarding their own military needs. For these reasons
countries probably won't fit neatly into one of the previously outlined categories.
Other variations which might change the technological level of a country of
particular weapons system include submarine retrofit. The ability to add anechoic
tiles to a submarine and therefore make it more difficult to detect is a growing
industry. Power plant change outs to replace outdated diesel/electric plants with
Sterling AlP power plants is an industry just developing in Sweden with possible
export to Japan. In addition, improvements in submarine launched weapons
continues. Cruise missiles, mines, and torpedoes of advanced design and extended
range are increasing the offensive punch of older platforms.
Variations and improvements in aircraft delivered ordnance is allowing low
or middle technology aircraft to delivery high technology weapons. In Western
Europe, several countries are making progress on developing autonomous, or near-
autonomous guided bombs. France, Germany, the UK, Israel, South Africa,
Russia and Japan are developing or fielding smart bombs. The depth and breadth
of international efforts in designing autonomous guided bombs is a clear indicator
of the importance world military establishments place on such technologies. 39
5. The Applications of Space
Another area that will play an increasingly important role in future military
developments is the use of space for military purposes. The US military relies
heavily on space based assets for surveillance, I&W and communications support
for strategic as well as tactical users. Currently only the United States, Russia,
China, France, Japan, India, and Israel posses an indigenous space-launch
capability, but a number of others have had satellites launched by states with such
a capability. 40
The spread of space technology and the overall cost reduction has allowed
many more countries access to space. Virtually any state in the developing world
can gain access to satellite data with military applications, because satellite
imagery and communications channels are commercially available. Space
platforms can image almost anywhere on the earth using electro-optical, IR or
multi-spectral bands. The American LANDSAT 4 and 5 offers imagery with a
resolution down to 30 meters while the French-operated SPOT satellites resolution
is 15 meters. Iraq relied extensively upon satellite imagery during its war with
Iran, and, soon after the invasion of Kuwait, representatives of the Iraqi
39 Clifford Ben, Mark Hewish & Bill Sweetman, "Bolt from the Blue, Part 2, Making
Dumb Bombs Smart," International Defense Review, 12/92. p. 1180.40 Thomas G. Mahnken, "Why Third World Space Systems Matter", Orbis fall 91, p. 563.
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government tried to purchase current imagery of the Middle East from the
EOSAT.41 A space based synthetic-aperture radar was placed into orbit on 17 July
1991 by the European Space Agency (ESA). This platform has a 30m spatial
resolution within a 100 km swath.' 2
A network of commercial satellite-based radars and other sensors could be
used by Third World governments to vector maritime patrol aircraft to potential
contacts, to observe fleet movements, and for verification of naval confidence
building measures agreements limiting the scale of exercises or their geographical
extent.43 !ndeed, the CBS television network program 60-Minutes contracted with
the former Soviet Union for satellite imagery of Iraq prior to operation Desert
Storm.
As satellites become more important as a means of supporting and
enhancing military operations, some countries may feel compelled to develop
means to neutralize the capabilities of their adversaries. While anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapons require some highly sophisticated technology, particularly in
terms of acquiring and tracking the target of interest, the development of a
rudimentary ASAT by a state such as China, Israel, or India within the next twenty
years is not out of the realm of possibility. 4 Communications satellites, deployed
in geosynchronous orbit and thus out of range of most direct-ascent ASAT
systems, are vulnerable to jamming from the ground. Communications satellites
have been subject to radio interference from ground stations operating on the same
frequency.
MI. Future Scenarios
Trend projection is just that. It does not purport to predict the future with
specificity, but merely to point where macro-level processes are likely to head
given relatively minor changes in other external variables, notably politics. As
po'nted out by some of the original pathfinders in modem forecasting:
41 Ibid, p. 568.
4 2 David Foxcoell, "Satellite Surveilance, Ocean Observation w/ Snythetic Apeture
Radar", International Defense Review 8/9 1, p. 811.
43 Pamela-Pohling-Brown, Brigitte Sauerwein, International Defense Review, 5/91, pp.
407-421.
44 Orbis fall 91, p. 574.
28
The kinds of forecasting we have examined inspire little
confidence.. .nevertheless, something can be learned from
attempts at forecasting in terms of broadening and otherwise
educating the perspective of planners.. .planners should not only
employ forecasting techniques, but should also use the results
with principled skepticism (emphasis original). 4 5
Similarly, scenarios derived from forecasting and trend projection are a
necessary evil, not of tea-leaf reading, but of aetermining what is likely, what is
possible, and perhaps even what is totally unexpected. Scenarios used for research
(in this case, derived from strategic and high operational intelligence analysis to
support policy making and planning) allow exploration of alternative feasible
futures, both credible and incredible.46 In this spirit, a review of possible
scenarios for the next two decades based on the foregoing trend surveys seems an
appropriate close to this section. These scenarios are offered as an example of the
types of regional military conflict scenarios that military intelligence will need to
have specialists trained to address in depth.
The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) scenarios made public in February
1992 touch on seven possible contingencies during the period 1994-99 which
develop linearly from current conditions, including:
1. Coup in Panama.
2. Coup in Philippines.
3. Iraq invades Kuwait (again) and Saudi Arabia.
4. North Korea attacks South Korea.
5. Iraq and North Korea invade at once.
6. Russia invades Lithuania.
7. A hostile superpower (REGT) reemerges.4 7
While these scenarios are (at least somewhat) plausible and useful for
programming purposes, they are not overly imaginative and do not presume to
project past the end of the century. Further, they do not take into account the types
45 Heiss, Klaus P. and Klaus Knorr et al, Long Term Projections of Power. Political,
Military, and Economic Forecasting (Cambridge MA: Ballinger Publishing, 1973), pp.
185 and 190.
46 James J. Tritten, Scenarios, Simulations, and Games, Technical Report NPS-56-88-
029 (Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, October 1988), pp. 11-17.
47 Barton Gellman, "Pentagon War Scenario Spotlights Russia," Washington Post, 20
February 1992, p. 1. See footnote I for explanation of "REGT" acronym.
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of trends suggested in the new approach; they seer, to represent an overlay of
concerns from the Co' "far era on the Post-Cold War era. In at least the Korean
case, the very basis or u,,. scenario seems as likely as not to have disappeared by
2010.
Other scenario writers have exercised considerably more ingenuity and
raised very interesting questions and prospects based on changing conditions. In
general, these writers have concluded that "the coming era will see a return of
planning for limited wars of 19th century vintage" rather than a cataclysmic World
War Mn. 4 8 However, they have not neglected the prospect of how such a global
conflict might start in the next 20 years.49
Possibly the most important lesson that many Third World nations learned
from the Gulf War was that a country should not fight against the US or the West,
unless it has nuclear weapons. Certainly, if Iraq had possessed these weapons, the
US would not have reconsidered its commitment. Entanglements in the Third
World in which both sides have nuclear weapons take on a totally new aspect. In
the Gulf War, Congressional support for the conflict would certainly have been
harder to obtain. The acquisition of nuclear weapons has probably become the sine
qua non for nations aspiring for regional dominance. The cachet of nuclear
weapons has not been diminished in the Third World, in spite of the proclamations
of many world leaders that such weapons serve no purpose whatsoever.
In the Americas, proximity rather than large scale or high intensity will
likely continue to dictate US intelligence interest during the next two decades. A
Panamanian coup or crisis threatening access to the Canal, a Cuban collapse, and
Central American instability are all possibilities, as well as a continuing counter-
drug situation throughout the region. However, interstate competitions and
intrastate instabilities, especially involving Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile
are likely to become more significant. In particular, an upsurgent Brazil has the
potential to independently develop maritime and aerospace power sufficient for
South American and mid-Atlantic regional preeminence. Of course traditional nval
Argentina would not allow such a development to go unchallenged. Such
preeminence could not only provoke a clash with a Venezuela acting as the
primary US partner in the region based on strategic petroleum realities, but also
48 Richard L. Kugler, The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Forces and
Requirements for the Post-Cold War Era, RAND Report R-4194-EUCOM/NA (Santa
Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 1992), p. 58.4 9 James Digby, Marc Dean Millot, et al, How Nuclear War Might Start: Scenarios from
the Early 21st Century, RAND Note N-2614-NA (Santa Monica CA: RAND
Corporation, October 1988), pp. iii-iv.
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with the French over their space interests in French Guiana. Even a clash with a
resurgent Japan expanding its influence around the Pacific Rim with, say, a
Chilean or Peruvian partner cannot be ruled out.50 However, the magnitude of the
more likely scenarios in the Americas will probably be on a smaller order than
those surrounding the Eurasian landmass.
This vastness, encompassing the better part of the earth's surface, and by
virtually all measures on a relative upswing, will probably be home to some of the
most dynamic scenario developments for the next two decades. Particularly for the
Pacific and East Asia, scenarios are as likely to involve economic and
technological competition as political and military conflicts. This is less true for
Central and South Asia, owing to the dramatic intersection of so many spheres of
influence. As might be expected, several of the situations, including a reconstituted
Russian threat and a threat to Gulf oil fields, overlap with those in Europe and
Southwest Asia. Two key occurrences which are likely, but not certain, to take
place by 2010 and which will affect scenarios are Korean reunification and
consolidation of Greater China, including Hong Kong and Taiwan. Another
important "swing vote" will be whether Japan chooses to invest more of its
economic potential into its military, and whether it chooses to (or is able to)
maintain its current relationship with the US.
Still, the possibility of a renewal of the Korean War or a nuclear
confrontation with North Korea cannot be ignored for the coming two decades,
unless the unification process proceeds sufficiently far to end those threats. These
twin scenarios constitute the worst case in current US thinking about East Asia
and the Pacific. However, from a regional perspective a civil war within a major
Asian state, China-Taiwan tensions, a major armed China-Vietnam conflict over
the Spratly Islands, or another Indo-Pakistani or China-India War would all be
considered just as dangerous, and none seem any less likely than the Korean
contingencies during the next two decades. A civil war, insurgency, or coup in the
Philippines remains a constant possibility the US considers, but the same can
arguably be said about Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Burma.5 1
Whether historical and previous strategic ties make a Philippines scenario any
more important than the others is not an intelligence decision.
50 For a remarkable exposition of how such a Japan-Brazil conflict could become limited
nuclear conflict on a global basis, see "Scenario 11: War in Space," Digby, pp. 82-9.
51 James A. Winnefeld, Jonathan D. Pollack, et al, A New Strategy and Fewer Forces:
The Pacific Dimension, RAND Report R-4089/2-USDP (Santa Monica CA: RAND
Corporation, 1992), pp. 82-5.
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More interesting scenarios result from following current trends toward their
logical conclusions. A "Greater China," buoyed by years of constant growth,
continues to modernize forces and demonstrate influence both south and east from
its coast, and west and north on its borders. A more independent, confident Japan
moves out of the shadow of the US security umbrella and modestly increases its
defense expenditures, without severing ties with the US. A reunified Korea,
working with regional partners to bear unification costs, reorients its security
posture outward and moves for equidistance from China, Japan, the US, and
Russia. Russia, or perhaps a breakaway Far East Republic, continues to seek
economic opportunities from China, Korea, and Japan, and while still a significant
regional military power, chooses not to exercise that capability too aggressively.
To the south, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gradually
incorporates Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma, assisting their transitions to
free market economies and "Asian capitalism." At the same time, ASEAN seeks to
balance Chinese and Japanese increases in maritime influence in the South China
Sea and the peninsular and archipelagic straits to the Indian Ocean. India expands
its sea reach eastward and comes into sporadic contact, if not conflict, with the
Japanese, Chinese, and ASEAN on the oceans. To the north, India continues to
have simmering disputes with Pakistan and China, but they are determinedly
controlled. And Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian republics develop inroads
into western China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, further strengthening the Islamic
and Turkic revival. In short, growing Pacific and Asian powers are likely to have
even more opportunities for contact, conflict, or cooperation in the next 20 years.
From a US perspective, scenario and contingency outcomes for these areas
during the next twenty years very much hinge on four factors: the existence and
viability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the development of
the EC; the evolution of Russia and the western Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) members, particularly Ukraine; and competition for predominance in
the Islamic (including Turkic and Arabic) world. A major unexpected development
in any of these areas would radically alter conditions and outcomes. Additionally,
the danger of 1914-style chain reactions cannot be overlooked.
For example, a renewed peacetime competition between NATO and
Russia/CIS states is possible, following mutual reductions in nuclear arsenals and
the subsequent potential weakening of credible deterrence. Even more remote is
the prospect of a spectrum of NATO-Russia/CIS conflicts, such as a combined
aerospace-maritime war, or invasions of Germany or Turkey. Despite the
remoteness of these possibilities, they form the "worst cases" which must be
considered as feasible, though not credible at this time. More likely, but not
greatly so, are prospects of Russia/CIS military operations in Eastern Europe
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including the Baltic Republics, or an intra-CIS war, such as Russia-Ukraine. 52
The point is that Russia, despite all recent developments, remains the single largest
national military force in Europe, and probably will continue to be so during the
next two decades. For this reason, it cannot be discounted totally.
Still, by far more likely in the future (as evidenced by recent events) are
local East European/Balkan crises, crises involving Arab/Islamic powers, and"other contingencies." 5 3 There is no reason to suppose that intractable ethnic,
cultural, and religious problems in these areas will subside; in fact, there is every
reason to believe they will get worse as participants gain in lethal technologies.
The Balkans, particularly the remnants of Yugoslavia, will remain the "powder keg
of Europe," with or without UN/NATO intervention. A generalized Balkan War, in
fact, could end NATO if Greece and Turkey resumed active hostilities. And
permutations too numerou.. to list, such as Turkey-Bulgaria, Hungary-Romania,
and Romania civil war are all possible.
Another Arab-Israeli war (with or without US involvement) and a second
(third?) Gulf War involving Iran, Iraq, or both against Gulf littoral states and their
allies perennially top scenario-writers' lists for Southwest Asia. However, a
spectrum of potential conflicts in Southwest Asia ranges from terrorist/counter-
terrorist actions, to attacks on NATO's southern flank, to a "water war" pitting
Turkey against Iraq and Syria. Internal instabilities resulting in Islamic
fundamentalist successes, including potentially Egypt, could have serious regional
ramifications.
Sub-Saharan Africa, largely marginalized by its enduring problems, will
probably continue to be a candidate primarily for those "other contingencies,"
including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and international peacekeeping.
However, the impact of sub-Saharan scenarios should not be neglected, since they
will probably demand progressively more of the resources currently concentrated
on Europe and Southwest Asia.54
Scenarios such as these need to be used immediately to: (1) reinforce to
former enemies and ourselves that we no longer consider each other the enemy; (2)
to help shape domestic and allied emphasis on new issues; (3) to educate strategic
planners and intelligence officers alike on new requirements; and (4) to support
program and operational war planning. Military intelligence must be active
participant in the new scenario creation process.
52 Kugler, pp. 58-63.
53 Kugler, p. 59.54 Kugler, pp. 62-5.
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Chapter Three
Intelligence: A New Approach
People do not put new wine into old wineskins. Otherwise the
skins burst, the wine spills out, and the skins are ruined.
Rather, they pour new wine into fresh wineskins, and both are
preserved.---Matthew 9:17
L Identifying Regional Intelligence Requirements
As has been previously pointed out, a regional focus has already overtaken
US strategic plr ning. The "re-emergent/emergent global threat" (REGT) remains
a concern for the intelligence community. 1 However, the only way to detect and
track potential REGTs before they achieve their potential will be to closely
observe the present and project the future trends in all global regions, using the
analytic lenses outlined previously, the "old wineskin" of the Cold War
intelligence apparatus is ill-suited to capture the necessary essences of the regional
focus---the "new wine."
Regional powers are far more likely to impinge on US interests in many
ways during the coming decades than a putative REGT, requiring a fresh
intelligence approach. This approach may be termed, in the Biblical metaphor, a
"fresh wineskin" adequate to preserve the "new wine." Due to limited resources, it
is plainly impossible to comprehensively cover the globe simultaneously. The
question is how to determine priorities? Where do US national interests intersect
the strategic environment? What situations can the military instrument of national
power significantly affect? Can the public and decision makers be persuaded, if
necessary, not to reflexively adopt Euro-Atlantic priorities first? It seems
incumbent, from the intelligence perspective, to provide as close to "ground truth"
as possible on the global and regional strategic environments. However, as always,
it will be the policy makers, assisted by strategic planners who will ultimately
determine what constitutes national interest, both globally and regionally, and
who will provide direction to the intelligence community consonant with that
determination. Intelligence professionals will continue to be obligated to provide
honest feedback on the appropriateness of tasking and coverage, even if that
feedback conflicts with previous assumptions.
1 This relatively neutral phrase of choice comes from the supporting scenarios for the
1994-99 Defense Planning Guidance, released in February 1992, to indicate a new
superpower which emerges from the former Soviet Union or some combination of
powerful nations to threaten US interests.
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There are two dominate trends which will impact on the role of
US military intelligence in the future. The first is the end of the bipolar
world and the global diffusion of economic and military power. With the
US the sole remaining superpower, regional states that view the US as a
threat can now no longer rely on the Soviet Union to inhibit US military
action. They may now develop, instead, an indigenous deterrent
capability. Predicting the military-technical potential of various regional
actors in the world will become more important to the intelligence
community in its production of strategic intelligence. The second major
trend is the revolution in military affairs brought on by the integration of
the computer into all facets of military operations as well as the
development of precision guided weaponry. This revolution is causing
fundamental changes in the nature of warfare which increase the necessity
for accurate operational intelligence.
The recent controversy of whether human or technical
intelligence is more effective is of secondary importance to the task of
defining the role of each in the intelligence process. The vital question is
how to use both types of sources synergistically. Most technical means of
intelligence can only focus on a narrowly defined target, or as Colonel Alan
Campen describes it, they "see the world through a straw." 2  While
technical intelligence means may well be the most useful and politically
acceptable means of intelligence gathering, we need to know where to look.
The recent development of religious activism and ethno-
nationalism are subjects which are not optimized for collection by national-
technical means (NTMs). In fact, a portion of the blame for the failure to
predict the demise of the former Soviet Union can be placed on the
overemphasis on NTMs. This provided a near-sighted view, and failed to
pay adequate notice to the increasing economic, political and ethno-
nationalist crises. Therefore, increased emphasis should be placed on non-
technical means of intelligence collection, such as human intelligence,
attaches and open source collection. These sources, can help to provide a
guiding framework for the early identification of broad trends.
2 Col Alan Campen, "New Technology Alters Support For Intelligence," Signal, October 1992, p.
60.
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In particular, OSINT collection and analysis stands as an under-utilized but
highly cost effective way of more accurately defining specific intelligence
objectives. A recent triumph of open source intelligence was the determination
that the Russians have a substantial lead in the development of electromagnetic
pulse weaponry. The existence of this highly advanced program, which appears
on the verge of production, was discovered by US military scientists on a fact-
finding mission to the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute near Nizhniy
Novgorod .3 Clearly, OSINT can be a useful adjunct to more traditional means of
collection.
As Stansfield Turner, in his article on the future role of intelligence in the
Fall 1991 issue of Foreign Affairs, summed up the necessity for both human and
technical intelligence means:
Above all, America will have the ability to integrate both the
human and the technical efforts that combine for successful
collection. Each system has its strengths and weaknesses and we
must make them play to each other.4
Another consideration is that the new paradigm for intelligence requires
new analytical expertise in areas which have previously not been emphasized. The
central role of economics as the driving force behind military potential requires an
analytical expertise capable of understanding economic issues. This also applies in
equal measure to previously neglected areas such as ethno-nationalism and
religious activism. Stansfield Turner relates that the greatest intelligence failure
during his tenure as CIA director was to fail to grasp the popular upswell of
support for the Iranian Revolution. The US intelligence apparatus was narrowly
focused on elite opinion and social conditions in a few major cities, and failed to
adequately understand how deeply the Ayatollah Khomeini's call for revolution
would resonate among the masses. 5 The top-down approach of the new
intelligence paradigm places an emphasis on attempting to come to grips with
these sweeping trends.
A hesitant first attempt to surwy the present and future world using the
"fresh wineskin" approach must by its nature be uncertain. Nevertheless, ample
precedent exists for this approach. In the pre-Cold War era, in fact, before
technology came to dominate the intelligence world, it constituted the dominant
3 Nick Cook, "Russia Leads in 'Pulse' Weapons," Jane's Defense Weekly, 10 Oct 1992, p.
54 Stansfield Turner, "Intelligence for a New World Order," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1991, p.
159
5 Turner, p. 157
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paradigm. Even at the height of the Cold War, intelligence professionals never
entirely abandoned its practice, but the ratio of effort concentrated on the single
predominant target was so lopsided as to overshadow all other areas by a wide
margin.
The primary method of Cold War intelligence was inductive---taking
specific pieces of intelligence information and using them to generalize about a
pre-defined threat. Previously to the Cold War, however, and lacking intrusive
technical means to collect a great deal of specific information, analysts employed a
more deductive approach.---taking what in general was known about the
subject being analyzed, and bounding the possible specific outcomes in areas of
interest. What this "new" approach represents, then, analogous to the "new"
world situation it must consider, is actually the re-emergence of an old approach,
with new imperatives, new opportunities, and new capabilities.
The important thing now is to collectively begin scanning the national
security horizon, flexibly applying the combination of this new/old approach and
the vastly improved opportunities and capabilities now available to the global
regions with an eye to finding the unusual, the unexpected, the counter-
conventional. Surveying from the present ahead 15-20 years, to 2010, may yield in
broad brush a hint of the kinds of problems and opportunities intelligence should
be seeking out. The following brief attempt looks for long term indicators in all
regions that need to be on the "short list" of intelligence priorities. We adopt this
approach rather than reviewing all regions on an exhaustive basis. A full
application of this approach would, of course, apply comprehensively within as
well as across regions. 6 In brief, the review below suggests that global centers of
gravity are shifting from within the Northern and Western Hemispheres
toward the Southern and Eastern Hemispheres.
We will begin by an analysis of the physical and cultural geography of a
nation. What are its resources? What are its limitations? Is its population highly
educated? Is there a population explosion, or massive population shifts from one
region to another, from the countryside to the city, which are potentially
disruptive? Are there ethnic groups who desire autonomy or independence? Do
6 For such a near-term comprehensive review, see the annual testimony of the unified and
specified commanders-in-chief (U&S CINCs) before the Senate Armed Services
Committee 20-22 April 1993. Grant Willis and William Matthews, "Commanders' View
of the World: Tensions, Crises Abound Even as US. Draws Down," Air Force Times, 3
May 1993, pp. 6-8; and "Special Report: Gen. Hoar Warns Senate Committee Iran Poses
Growing Threat to Gulf," Inside the Navy, 26 April 1993, pp. S 1 -S 10.
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minority groups aspire to unite with some bordering state? Only by having such
broad knowledge, largely derived from open sources, and the analysis of country
specialists, will the intelligence community be able to point to areas which show
the potential for future conflict.
As important as geography will be economic analysis. Here the question
will be, "What kinds of material will this nation be able to afford in the next ten
years?" This type of analysis will be tempered by knowledge of the culture, since
the propensity for self-sacrifice (for example, of consumer goods, in order to be
able to purchase military hardware) will be very different from one nation to
another.
What will be the composition of militaries of the future, and how will they
fight their battles? Nations can be divided into categories based on the types of
hardware that they could afford to develop or purchase.
The challenges of military intelligence have multiplied. Not only are the
potential adversaries dramatically increased in number, so are the types of warfare
to be waged, the kinds of weaponry to be faced, and the varieties of coalitions that
may be assembled as ad hoc allies. There are two elements to this new
intelligence paradigm: first, foreseeing the spectrum of the varieties of future wars,
and second, meeting the intelligence requirements of these conflicts.
The former methods of indications and warning (I&W) have been rendered
largely obsolete by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the past it was often
possible to assess Soviet intentions through long-term analysis of hardware. One
could count the number of hulls being laid down in shipyards, and knowing the
time required for construction and fitting out, it was possible to come up with a
fairly accurate future order of battle. In the future, regional powers will be able to
purchase their hardware on the open market with increased ease. The I&W
problem is thereby complicated, to the point that intelligence will be even more
unable to accurately predict the intentions of potential adversaries.
0. Estimating Military Potential
With the changing US military strategy there evolves a need for a change in
the methods and determining criteria used by the military intelligence community.
During the Cold War, most of our intelligence collection effort revolved around
the Soviet Union. Much effort was placed in attempting to understand the way the
Soviet leadership thought and to accurately predict what they would employ their
forces.7 Today, most of US intelligence is collected from countries other than the
7 James J. Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare: Weapons, Employment and
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former Soviet Union. This presents a more challenging analysis mission. Whereas
with the Soviet Union, it was reasonable to consider her a "rational player," in
dealing with many Third World nations, the assumptions of a "rational actor" often
does not hold.8
To understand or to predict foreign actions has become more difficult.
Intelligence efforts focused on enemy intentions becomes almost impossible;
reinforcing the need for military intelligence to focus on the level of potential
military capability of a nation. This can be done by focusing on four major
factors: population; geography; its economic strength; and the technology
available to that country---both through indigenous development and purchase.
Capabilities, combined with exercise behavior and employment patterns, are also a
means of ascertaining intentions. 9 In a world full of irrational players and
assimilar values, determining a nation's military potential will prove to be the most
efficient means of determining its potential as an enemy.
A. Population
There are several significant variables in factoring the military potential of a
population. The first, is the impact of population growth. Particularly in Third
World nations, rapid population growth creates social unrest through poverty and
commonly leads to lack of popular support for a government. Ethnic and territorial
disputes become more frequent, drawing away attention and resources from a
nation's adversaries. 10 Rapid population growth also causes competition for
limited resources, which might otherwise have gone toward a military effort.
Migration is a second aspect to analyze when looking at a country's
population. A large number of people moving from the country side into cities
could indicate an increase in industry and a sign of relative strength; while a mass
exodus across borders into neighboring nations indicates the opposite. The spread
of AIDS and other diseases which tend to undermine political security is another
aspect to scrutinize. The availability of natural resources is of vital importance in
a capabilities assessment.
Policy, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 105-111.
8 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (USA:
Harper Collins Publishing, 1971), pp. 10-38.
9 Tritten, pp.105-111.
10 James J. Tritten and Paul N. Stockton, eds., Reconstituting America's Defense: The
New US National Security Strategy, (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1992), pp. 31-
49.
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The education level is also significant; an illiterate army may, even one of
great size, when placed in difficult, thought provoking situations, may prove
ineffectual, i.e., Iraq's in the "mother of all battles." The technical expertise of a
nation is also critical and reflects on a nation's capability to utilize the true
potential of technically sophisticated weaponry. Many nation can purchase state
of the art equipment, but not all can operate it effectively. Training standards,
obviously, must also be considered in the overall evaluation.
The strategic culture of a nation is a factor which is often overlooked. A
nation which has prided itself on its ability to remain uninvolved in any type of
military conflict, may very well prove to be ineffectual in war, no matter what
types of military hardware are at its disposal. The culture of a nation and the
environment in which the population is raised breeds the instincts for war fighting.
For example, the US, where video games and computers are introduced to very
young children, has a population technological advantage. Perhaps most
importantly, while our culture dictates peace, it would be dangerous to assume the
rest of the world strives for the same goal.
Fundamentally, the strength (or weakness) of every human entity, whether
political, economic, social, cultural, or otherwise, rests in the ability of its people
to make the most of what they have, to capitalize on their strengths and minimize
their weaknesses. Numerous factors fall under the population heading, not least
sheer weight of numbers. Indicating a repeated theme throughout this
examination, the Soviet Union's breakup has cast Russia from the first population
tier to the second or third, somewhere between Indonesia and Brazil on the high
side and Japan and Pakistan below. 1 1
In the next 15-20 years, China and India together will continue to dominate
the world population figures (the US comes in a distant third), leading the belt of
population stretching from Latin America through Africa and Asia's entire
southern flank. Current net population growth rates show, perhaps unsurprisingly,
the fastest growth coming in the center of that belt, comprising Southwest Asia.
Crude birth rates, however, are highest in those areas least able to sustain them,
notably sub-Saharan Africa. By contrast, the population growth rates of the
industrialized regions, including North America, Western Europe, and Japan, are
slowing and in some cases stopping, as their populations age. In these regions, a
"11 "Comparison Charts" and "Thematic Maps," PC Globe Version 5.0 personal computer
database software (Tempe AZ: PC Globe Inc., 1992). Unless otherwise cited, further
comparisons of current demographic, geographic, and economic figures also come from
this source.
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very significant impact on population is migration, with the irresistible magnet of
economic opportunity drawing increasing numbers from those areas of rapid
population growth but stagnating or declining economic promise.
The concomitant imbalance in resource consumption has been a staple of
the Malthusian and North-South literature for years, depicting the relatively small
and aging population of the industrialized regions consuming most of the global
resources, while the majority of humankind in the very regions from whence the
resources come get the distinct minority of those resources' benefits. Directly
related to this imbalance are human health and ecological concerns, including
starvation, malnutrition, disease, agricultural and mineral wealth depletion, to
name just a few. In fact, the potential for these to be used as strategic weapons
likely will become a more serious concern in the next two decades: whether as
biological or chemical weapons intended to inflict mass casualties, or perhaps
genetically targeted; or as environmental terrorism of the kind attempted by Iraq.
These dynamics will not abate in the next 15-20 years; indeed, expectations are the
contrasts will only sharpen. The difference from the past 20 years and more will
be the increasing ability of the slighted populations to successfully contest
resource control by the industrialized regions and within their own regions, to their
own benefit and possibly, but not necessarily, to the detriment of the current
privileged minority.
Potent population-related forces will influence resource control by growing
"have-not" populations which want to join the "haves." Education may do more
than any other single factor to contribute to increased development and
productivity of a given population, and the fact that China, India, and other
growing population centers have been and are taking advantage of the educational
opportunities presented in the industrialized regions should not be overlooked.
Even when mass education seems neglected, as in many parts of Southwest Asia,
Africa, and Latin America, education of technocratic elites proceeds apace in
recognition of education's multiplier effect on economic and social development.
Ideology, religion, and social-cultural values have tremendous potential both
positive and negative, especially when fused with educational processes.
Ideological, religious, and social-cultural "fault lines" no longer (and
perhaps never did) fall neatly into First, Second, and Third World categories. The
previously noted population growth rates of Southwest Asia should be considered
carefully in light of the revival of the Islamic crescent stretching from the southern
Mediterranean littoral, through North Africa, the whole of central and southern
Asia, to the extremes of Indopjria. Islam's clash with its cousins in Abraham, the
Judeo-Christian realm to the west and north, and its alien competitors Hinduism,
Buddhism, Confucianism and animism to the east and south, is likely to be even
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more prominent in the next 15-20 years than the last 20. On a smaller scale within
regions, the imploding Yugoslavia suggests the kinds of suppressed tensions which
are likely to reemerge in all regions as population pressures on geographical
factors increase, perhaps to be repeated in the Russian Federation. On the other
hand, German reunification and the increasing prospect of a reunited Korea
suggest that certain recent historical anomalies which split along Cold War
ideological fault lines may be susceptible to return to more traditional patterns.
These issues of population have traditionally been outside of the mainstream of US
military intelligence. In order to support our new national military strategy, US
intelligence officers are going to have to redirect their attention away from their
traditional scientific and technical interests to "softer" issues like population.
Many of the issues related to population can be learned through traditional area
studies education at graduate schools.
B. Geography
The size of a country and the area it must defend can tell much about its
military potential. Russia is a prime example. Its tremendous size mandates a
preferential defense, and the physical location of its people makes it more of a
potential threat to the nations to its west and south rather than to its east (Alaska).
The lack of defendable borders has lead to centuries of invasion which in turn has
influenced the population's attitude toward defense and government, and has
forged a unique strategic culture.
Yugoslavia is proving the importance of the physical characteristics of a
country as well. One reason the Serbian rebels do not believe the US will become
militarily involved in their conflict is the rugged physical characteristics of the
country. Dependability is another key factor, as demonstrated by US strategic
considerations for defending Guam and the Philippines prior to World War II.
Regional relations are critical. A country surrounded by adversaries will
tend to maintain a viable military force and will be more likely to use it. A lack of
cross-cultural understanding or tolerance leads to conflict and military build-up.
Studying historical rivalries can tell a great deal about military potential. The
Middle East conflicts, for example, can not be understood without a historical
study of its rivalries, often originating form aspects of geography, i.e., water
supply.
Unlike population, geography is largely a fixed quantity in determining
regional developments. Barring cataclysmic volcanic and tectonic events, such
existing factors as landmass area, global positioning, terrain, ocean access, and
weather patterns must simply be accepted as they are. The more human-scale
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dynamic elements of geography of course derive from the impact of population:
manmade features, such as population centers, economic facilities, and
transportation infrastructure (notably roads, railw ays, bridges, canals, ports,
airports, and space facilities); and manmade socio-cultural, economic, and political
boundaries and associations. These dynamic elements form the basis for
geopolitical and "geo-economical" interplay between regional entities, and to the
extent these change or can be made to change a basis for conflict (or, alternatively,
cooperation) exists.
Because of the relatively fixed nature of much geography, the resultant
basis for conflict seems to be recurrent, and thus historical reference can
provide insight for the future of various regions. To the extent human-driven
dynamics are at work, a new basis for conflict can be overlaid on the old, perhaps
superseding it altogether. Predominant geographic regional imperatives in the next
15-20 years will still largely incorporate those of the last 20, 200, or 2,000. To be
sure the identities and dynamics of the players will vary, but in many cases they
will simply be the latest iteration of the ongoing "dramatis personae" and drama.
The basis of national wealth, and hence national power, remains trade, and
trade requires friendly control or at least the absence of unfriendly control of key
locations and features. In the case of certain strategic resources, like oil or (one
might argue) illegal drugs, preserving or stopping the flow is considered so vital to
the interests of regional powers that the military instrument is willingly used to
preserve certain geographic realities and other regional objectives are
subordinated. With scientific and technological advances there is always the
possibility that a new critical strategic resource completely unanticipated could
significantly alter geographic dynamics. Other, more traditional imperatives,
however, will probably continue to exercise major influence.
Control of landmass, like the existence of large populations, dictates its
own unique influence. Despite the loss of roughly one-third of the controlled
territory of the USSR, Russia remains the largest nation-state in area on the planet,
followed by Canada. However, composed largely of Arctic tundra and sub polar
wastelands, both these giants suffer from the problem of what to do with all that
relatively useless landmass (with the significant exception of strategic mineral
wealth). The US and China, having a higher proportion of more usable landmass.
Brazil, with its huge biomass of Amazonian rain forest, is followed by Australia,
India, Argentina, and, interestingly, Kazakhstan. This "top ten" list shows,
however, that while sheer size may contribute to a nation's potential and certainly
its regional importance, by itself it doesn't automatically confer great power status.
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Without proceeding to a tedious listing, control of or access to certain well-
known straits, canals, islands, ports and sea routes will continue to largely define
maritime preeminence. Likewise, control of a relatively small number of
continental features, elevations, passes, isthmuses, peninsulas, and inland rivers
and lakes will substantially contribute to a land based power. Control of the
aerospace environment requires some combination of these, some newer critical
areas (such as near-equatorial landmass), as well as a threshold level of technology
(as described elsewhere in this report). A sizable proportion of items on all three
lists historically has resided and will continue to reside on the periphery of the
Eurasian landmass, while the geographic fact of the Americas being at both ends
of that landmass suggests these areas are where most of the geographically-
motivated trends will ontinue to occur.
C. Economics
The economic factors driving a country are often complex, but can perhaps
tell the most about a potential enemy's military potential. 12 When examining an
economy, there are essentially two aspects to view. The first is the country's
economic make-up and its allocation of economic resources. This aspect is a
purely internal view. Secondly, an external focus looks at how a nation relates to
the rest of the world. The key questions to answer are: what can a nation afford to
buy, what, specifically will they purchase, and how well can they maintain what
they buy?
Economics plays an important role in force planning as well as formulating
strategy. In creating, equipping and maintaining a military force, a decision must
be made as to how large a force is required to defend national interests, and how
much, financially will be dedicated to that effort. Knowing that only a fixed
amount of resources exist, something else of N alue must be given up in order to
support this military effort. This is determines the opportunity cost. Secondly, the
performance of a national economy sets limits on strategy and force planning.
Obviously, a strong economy is more able to invest in a large military than a weak
economy. Lastly, a nation's economic strength determines its position in the world
power structure 13.
12 Robert E. Looney, Third-World Military Expenditure and Arms Production, (London:
The MacMillian Press, Ltd, 1988). This book was used throughout the Economics section
of this paper as examples of how economics factor into military expenditures.13 CAPT Tom Lawler, US. Navy, CAPT William J. Neville, US Navy, and Mackubin T.
Owens, Jr., "The Political Economy of National Security," Economic Strategies for a
Changing World, pp. 101-109.
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Rapid technology development and diffusion, both globally and regionally,
are inextricably intertwined with trends in military spending and military capital
stock development, their influerre on outcomes can be difficult to predict.
Economic realities bound military spending and capital stock possibilities but do
not determine them. A multitude of political-military, strategic, social, cultural and
other factors determine the military burden a nation-state is willing to bear within
its economic capability. Indeed, it might be proposed that irrational factors at the
root of national consciousness are at least as influential as rational factors taken
into account by national leadership when it comes to military spending and capital
stock formation.
The purpose here is not to suggest why certain nation-states support heavy
military investments while others do not, though such would be an important
element of a comprehensive analysis. Nor is it to identify every nation-state that
supports or is likely to support a heavy military investment (such as Israel, Iraq,
Cuba, or Vietnam), though again such identification can be an important analytic
element. Rather, the purpose is to identify large-scale trends in military
spending and capital stock development, and interpret what they suggest about
the importance of various regions.
The US and the Soviet Union in the 1980s were at opposite ends of the
economic scale, but while the US spent a maximum of 6.7 percent of a large and
growing gross national product (GNP) on defense, the Soviets spent 25 to 33
percent of a much smaller one. But the breakup of the Soviet Union has radically
altered both reality and perceptions in military spending. Previously, given the
rosiest scenarios of US and Soviet constant real-currency military spending, and
successful Soviet economic restructuring, by 2010 the former Soviet Union would
have been militarily out spending the US by more than $30 billion 1986 dollars
annually; however, military capital stocks (meaning the current values of military
equipment and construction based on procurement costs and depreciation) would
have been roughly equal. 14 Now however, Russian military spending levels are
somewhere around 60-70 percent at best of the previous Soviet figures, with
considerably more uncertainty about Russian ability to even sustain that. Added to
the responsive (but less precipitous) US decline in military spending and capital
stock formation, it seems likely that the US will certainly have at least parity with
and perhaps superiority over Russia in both military spending and capital stock for
the next twenty years.
14 Wolf, pp. 15-18 and 21-23.
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Since natural resources are limited, goods and services are also limited. But
since human desires are virtually unlimited, some compromise must take place.
To understand how much a nation is willing to give up in order to maintain a
strong military provides needed insight into an intelligence estimate.
Understanding how a nation overcomes its lack of resources exposes
vulnerabilities which can be exploited. Also important is identifying what
resources a potential enemy has in excess. For example, Iraq's and Iran's large
share of the world's oil supply makes them nations of significant importance,
independent of their military might. Additionally, Iraq's acts of "environmental
terrorism" to Kuwait's oil industry at the end of the Gulf War caused great harm.
The US is dependent on a stable world economy for its resources, its
markets, investment and technology. That same dependency exists for almost
every nation in the world. Demography and economic disparity fuel instability
which can effect every nation. Understanding industry market sectors, trade
practices and economic sanctions are key in understanding the economy of a
potential enemy and therefore the military potential. An enemy's trading
partners, its suppliers of important resources as well as its trade and supply routes
are potential means of "soft-kill" or "chain" targeting which could prove vital in
deterring or winning a regional contingency.
Economic measures represent far more volatile variables in regional
situations than either population or geography. The relative difficulty of telling
what has already occurred in a single national economy should signal the difficulty
in trying to assess what could happen in regional and global economies in 15-20
years. Yet, even with the dizzying rates of increasing change in economies, some
conclusions can be drawn within a range of possibilities by projecting current
trends. By 2010, the US will probably continue to have the world's largest gross
national product (GNP), followed by Japan and China respectively. 15 (Indeed, by
new measures applied by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China already
has the third-largest GNP globally, and the World Bank even suggests China has
edged out Japan for second place!) 16 Whereas the Soviet Union, had it survived,
15 Charles Wolf, Jr., et al, Long Term Economic and Military Trends, 1950-2010, RAND
Note N-2757-USDP (Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, April 1989), pp. v-ix.
Economic forecasts cited in this section rely almost exclusively on this source, which was
prepared to support the Future Security Environment Working Group of the Secretary of
Defense's Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, which functioned from 1986-
88. While events since completion of this study have proved the impossibility of
specifically forecasting the future, the methodology and broad conclusions still seem sound
when adjusted for current realities.
16 Steven Greenhouse, "New Tally of World's Economies Catapults China Into Third
46
likely would have had the fourth largest, following its collapse Russia's GNP is
only about two-thirds that of the old USSR, putting Russia on a virtual par with
the UK in the second tier of regional and global economic power. Short of a true
economic miracle, the Russian situation is not likely to dramatically relatively in
the next two decades. When GNP per capita is considered, in 2010 China's will be
an order of magnitude below that of the US, and perhaps one-third that of Russia.
Japan's per capita GNP will, however, probably continue to be as high or higher
than that of the US.17
Comparison of certain regional aggregates two decades hence in relation to
the same aggregates today is also instructive. By 2010, the combined GNP of
Japan, Greater China (including Taiwan), and a unified Korea will very likely
exceed that of the US, as it does not at present. Further, this East Asian combined
GNP is likely by 2010 to exceed the combined GNP of the UK, France, and
Germany by 120 percent--more than double---while in 1980 the excess was less
than 20 percent. Several mid-level regional powers will also experience
significant growth: the combined GNP of India, Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Brazil,
Argentina and Mexico, which in 1980 was about 70 percent of the Western
European GNP cited above, in 2010 is likely to exceed that figure by nearly 20
percent. Throughout this period, the US share of the global GNP will likely
remain stable at around 22-23 percent. And demonstrating the link between
population and economy, though Mexico and Egypt, as examples of developing
countries, will probably experience positive economic growth during the next two
decades, population growth is likely to so outstrip it that unemployment in those
countries by 2010 could exceed 40 percent, with the attendant risks to social and
political stability.
While these conclusions are by no means exhaustive and comprehensive,
they do point to several striking and significant changes that impend in the
economic environment: the center of gravity in the global economy shifts to
Asia and the Pacific Rim; non-European economic powers display economic
growth and prominence relative to those of Western Europe; the share represented
by Russia in the international economy will probably further diminish; and the
share represented by the US in the international economy will remain stable over
the same 20-year period while the Russian share will probably diminish.18
Intelligence analysts can use such predictions at the strategic-level to help look for
a REGT and predict regional actors that might have surplus capital for
military expenditure.
Place," New York Times National Edition, 20 May 1993, p. Al.17 Wolf, p. 11.
18 Wolf, p. 14.
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Given both relative military spending/capital stock developments over the
next two decades, other powers will likely attain a commensurably greater military
capability with which the US will have to contend. China appears as a key figure,
with a relatively large and rising share of a fast-growing GNP devoted to military
spending; and is conservatively projected to have a military capital stock roughly
40 percent that of the US by 2010, and likely comparable to that of Russia. 19
Japan, with its unique constraints on spending, nonetheless by virtue of its
sizable and growing GNP and exchange rate peculiarities has the third largest
annual military spending in the world. If Japan chose for any reason to increase
military spending from 1 to 3 percent of GNP, by 2010 its annual spending might
reach 70 percent of that of the UK, France and Germany combined. Likewise.
even with constraints, in 20 years Japan's capital stock is likely to be almost half
that of Germany; with the above mentioned spending increases it could surpass
Germany's capital stock by 25 percent.
The mid-level regional powers, such as Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, India,
Brazil, and Egypt, will retain relatively small but formidable capital stocks,
relative to the world-class powers. However, they will likely incorporate
increasingly advanced systems, and these countries plus China will play an
expanding role in international arms production and export. Should Japan decide
for any reason to epnage in the arms trade, the picture would be ever -nore
significantly altered.2 O
The obvious conclusions drawn from these economic and military
spending considerations are that Japan and China will be no less important to
US security considerations in the coming decades than Russia and Western
Europe; and that the mid-level regional powers will increasingly occupy US
attention by dint of increasing economic and military capabilities.2 1
D. Technology
Technology is developing at a tremendously fast rate and is becoming a
motivating goal for every nation. While in the past, the US held a substantial lead
in the development of new technology, that lead has recently diminished. Due to
many factors, military research and development (R&D) in the US is also expected
to decline. Many countries have recently begun developing "in house," an
indigenous technology base with the help of foreign educated scientists, the "brain
drain" from Russia and industrial espionage. Dual-use technology, technology
19 Wolf, p. 23.
20 Wolf, pp. 18-20 and 23-25.
21 Wolf, p. 25.
48
shared for non-military means, can and is used in the development of military
arms. Often, secrecy shields this development and causes difficulty in assessing
the military capabilities of a potential enemy. The nuclear capability that Iraq had
developed prior to the Gulf War exhibits this trend.
While more countries are developing their own new technology, a rise is
also occurring in the purchase of new technology. The republics of the former
Soviet Union are selling their aircraft, submarines and other military equipment in
order to attain hard currency to stimulate the economy. Other countries, such as
France and Germany, sell arms because manufacturing in bulk reduces per-unit
cost. World arms trade has become more commercial and less curtailed by
Ideological inhibitions. Whether through legal or illegal channels, any country
with the financial means can purchase the most state of the art technology. Iran's
purchase of a KILO class submarine created overnight a tactical threat to the US in
the Arabian Gulf that intelligence analysts anticipated would take a decade, at
best. While just as dangerous as "in house" developments, open market weapons
proliferation is a public operation and can be traced. The key is establishing a
data base for technology exchanges between vendor and consumer.
While hardware is readily available, the supply of spare parts is usually
inadequate in Third World states. Without spare parts, maintenance is difficult to
impossible, and the potential for use decreases rapidly. Such limiting factors need
to be identified in advance by the military intelligence community.
Additionally, a nation which has the capital to purchase a submarine, but does not
have the educational program to train a crew, possess less of a threat.
E. FEimating Military Potential by the Analyst
To evaluate a nation based -,i its population, its geography, its economy or
its technology is a relatively simple task. The difficulty comes when all factors are
studied together. A country which maintains an air force equipped with the most
technologically advanced aircraft, is of little threat potential if it does not have the
economic ability to maintain the aircraft or the pilots with the education required
to fly them in combat. A country with the economy and the education and the
weaponry to be a world power will never assume such a role if it is their goal as a
nation to never see war, at any expense. Just as people, no two countries are
exactly the same. Personal, political, and economic interests are different in every
nation. To make assumptions based on the beliefs or interests of the US, mirror
imaging, could prove fatal. Every region must be considered individually and
every relevant factor evaluated. This is no simple task.
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MI. Defining Levels of Military Technological Potential
A. Scope of the Problem
The US expended vast resources over many years in order to have the
technologically superior military forces which were displayed to the world during
Desert Shield/Storm. These forces were sized, trained, and equipped in order to
deter the Soviet Union, the biggest nuclear capable "bully" on the block. All other
potential military threats were considered a lesser included case, and assumed to
be capable of being handled by the forces already existing. Because of inferior
numbers of ground troops and major pieces of equipment with which to engage the
Warsaw Pact during a conventional conflict in Europe, the US embarked on a
strategy of quality over quantity as well as nuclear weapons as a last resort.
Equipment of technological superiority was said to be a force multiplier on the
battlefield.
The major industrial countries of the world sell or provide billions of
dollars worth of military hardware and software to lesser developed countries
every year. The largest exporters of military equipment are Russia, the United
States, France, the United Kingdom (UK), and China. Countries typically provided
military aid to bolster a government with which they themselves have diplomatic
or military ties. Sales of military hardware are typically done for more economic
and less ideological reasons. Companies which used to have a ready market for
military hardware are finding the international arms market increasingly more
competitive.
A Government Accounting Office report titled, US Weapons: The Low-
Intensity Threat is Not Necessarily a Low-Technology Threat, contends that in
addition to the broad spectrum of potential LIW (Low Intensity Warfare) regions,
there are a wide variety of weapons that the US armed forces must be prepared to
confront. Threats are not only expanding in numbers, but becoming highly
diversified in which the types of weapons likely to be encountered may differ
significantly from country to country. Prominent in this diversity is modern,
sophisticated military hardware. The military-technology gap between the major
powers and the Third World is rapidly narrowing. Some exporters from
Western countries reportedly have been transferring ever more sophisticated
technology in order to compete in the Third World arms market.
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The growing proliferation of advanced conventional weapons and the
increasing dual technology potential of new systems greatly increases the
requirements on intelligence collectors and analysts. How then should countries
be classified? Should it be strictly according to their political and ideological
rhetoric? Should they be categorized according to their economic-industrial
potential? Or should they instead be based solely on their military hardware? No
simple model exists which would allow military planners to predict with 100
percent certainty who will and will not be a future potential adversary. What
planners can do, however, is to attempt to keep track of proliferation of military
hardware and technology. In this way a potential threat country can be
categorized as possessing either high/medium/low military technology potential.
Knowing this will allow an appropriate response to be put forth without
overextending dwindling resources.
The overall level of military technological capability of a country can be
determined by a countries military hardware and software, the level of education
and training of its troops, and the level of support available. During the Cold War
it was relatively easy to place countries into groupings based on technological
capabilities. Primarily countries were either supplied military equipment and
training from the West or the Warsaw Pact. A countries training level and
therefore its relative effectiveness on the field of battle was an area examined for
years by personnel within the operations analysis area of study. Additionally a
countries ability to support varying levels of technology could be determined,
although not always easily.
Today the international arms market is wide open as suppliers struggle to
keep production lines open. Future adversaries of the US will likely be
technologically advanced to some degree. The challenge for intelligence
collectors and analysts will be to determine the level of military technological
sophistication and therefore the level of capability that an adversary possesses.
This task has become extremely difficult in the post-Cold War world as countries
are less likely to posses military equipment from only one side or the other. We
can no longer expect that former Soviet client states will posses and deploy
equipment exactly as they were taught.
While it is difficult to determine what technological revolutions might be
made in the future, we can make assumptions based on the proliferation of systems
fielded today and their anticipated evolution. Many countries including Russia,
China, France, and the US sell front line military equipment to other countries.
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The economics associated with fielding a technologically superior military are also
unlikely to change drastically in the future. Sophisticated equipment in quantity,
and the ability to operate and maintain it will be key identifiers of the level of
military technology of a country.
B. Military Hardware/Software Sellers in 2010
One of the effects of the Gulf War is that the US share of weapons
production for transfer was increased. Many weapons production lines are only
being kept open because of foreign purchases. This is not to say that the US will
become the only producer of weapons in the future; the peace dividend effect of
the thawing of tensions has resulted in increased competition between major
producers of weapons systems. Which countries are likely to be the major non-US
producers of weapons hardware and software in the year 2010? Russia, China,
Europe and Japan.
In desperate need of hard currency, Russia is actively seeking buyers for
their weapons. Russia has shown there to be very few "no-go" zones in terms of
what will be sold and to whom. Political pressure is keeping the transfer of
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or technology a very sensitive area,
however. Exports such as advanced fighters, MBTs, surface to air missiles
(SAMs), and diesel/electric submarines are up for sale at very reasonable prices.22
China has been the fifth largest exporter of conventional weapons, behind
the USSR, USA, France and the UK, during the period 1986-1990.23 This trend
is expected to continue in the future as China markets her latest weapons. China's
major exports include anti-ship and ballistic missiles, warships, and technology.
Chinese missile co-operation with developing states -- in terms of sales of
complete systems and subsystems as well as production assistance -- represents
perhaps the world's most comprehensive program of transfer of missile technology.
The major arms producers within Europe, particularly those in France, Germany,
Italy, and the UK will continue to play a major role in the future. The continuing
interdependence of n~tional economies will likely require future major weapons
projects to be produced as a cooperative effort. The companies within each
country which produce the best equipment will likely remain while increased
competition will drive many into other arenas.
22 Dr. Mark Galeotti, "The Russian Arms Bazaar", Jane Intelligence Review 4/92, p. 491.
23 Brigitte Sauerwein, "Post-Soviet Economy: the military legacy", International Defense
Review 4/92, p. 324.
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In 1976, a formal policy statement to the Japanese Diet strengthened a previously
established ban to prohibit virtually all arms exports. This policy could change in
the future depending on the economic outlook of various world economies, and the
feelings of the Japanese people. The Japanese have the industrial base and
technological sophistication necessary to produce and market successfully a wide
variety of weapons systems, including ships, planes, and ballistic and cruise
missiles.
C. Defining Levels of Technology by Analysts
The technology gap has and in all likely probabilities will continue to
narrow between the major industrial countries and the lesser developed nations of
the world. One of the major focuses for intelligence collectors and analysts
should be in the determination of a regions or individual countries desire for
military-technical equipment. Technologically sophisticated military hardware
and software will continue to be sought by those who feel threatened and we
should attempt to predict this.
Policy makers should be advised of a nations relative military-technical
status and attempts being made to upgrade. The intelligence community can
develop the expertise necessary for such prediction, but they will require a
major revision to their cultural self-identity.
A key factor in determining military power in the post Cold War era will be
in the tracking of vendor-consumer exchanges of hardware and technology. Of
greatest concern is the spread of nuclear and chemical weapons and ballistic
missile related-technology, including the hiring of foreign scientists and weaponry
experts by consumer nations. The task of tracking such exchanges is becoming
increasingly complex as the number of nations participating in both nuclear
research and arms production grows at a rapid rate.
Until the 1980s, the US and the Soviet Union were the world's primary
arms suppliers. Recently, however, there has been a distinct trend towards
regional arms suppliers, such as Israel, Brazil, China and North Korea.
Additionally, whereas arms sales in the past were driven by strategic and political
considerations, the new change in the world geopolitical structure has led to sales
being driven primarily by profit motive. In the past, a nation's political alignment
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would dictate, out of necessity, the type of military hardware one could procure.
Recently, this model has been turned on its head with nations such as Abu Dhabi,
a traditional consumer of Western arms, purchasing a large quantity of Russian
armored infantry fighting vehicles.24
In some cases, these sales can have profound implications. Recently, Israeli
Aircraft Industries sold the People's Republic of China the electronic
countermeasures package originally developed for the abortive US-Israeli Lavi
fighter program. This state of the art package is being fitted on the majority of the
Chinese tactical fighter-bomber force and will likely greatly improve its
survivability in the face of modern air defenses.2 5
Another distinctive trend has been the increasing cost of high technology
weaponry which has led to an increase in cooperative production. This includes
both cooperatior, among Third World nations and cooperation between first tier
states and the Third World. Attracted by cheap labor, expanding industrial bases
and increasingly technologically competent work forces, many developed nations
have begun cooperative production with Third World nations. To cite one
example, Russia's Yakovlev Design Bureau recently approached both India and
China with an offer for co-development and production of the YAK-141 verticaltake off fighter.2 6
In similar vein, over 72 percent of the funding for the Israeli Arrow anti-
tactical ballistic missile program came from the US Strategic Defense Initiative. 27
These cooperative programs accelerate the global diffusion of technology and
provide a technological base for further development of indigenous weaponry. For
these reasons, collection of intelligence information on these cooperative
relationships will provide a useful vehicle for tracking technological expertise.
IV. Implications for Operational and Tactical Intelligence
In the 1980s, Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, then-Chief of the Soviet General
Staff, first predicted a revolution in military affairs brought on by the development
of long-range, precision-guided strike capability and supporting intelligence and
command and control capabilities. In 1984, Marshal Ogarkov made the following
commentary on the emerging military/technical revolution:
24 Christopher Foss, "Cut Rate Price-, Challenge Western Sales," Jane's Defense Weekly,
3 Apr 1993, 12
25 Edmond Dantes, "The PLA Air Force Build-Up: An Appraisal," Asian Defense
Journal, Nov 1992, pp. 44-46
26 Amit Gupta, "Third World Militaries: New Suppliers, Deadlier Weapons," Orbis,
Winter 1993, 57
27 lbid, p. 64
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.. rapid changes in the development of conventional means of
destruction and the emergence in the developed countries of
automated reconnaissance and strike complexes, long-range
highly accurate terminally guided combat systems, unmanned
flying machines, and qualitatively new electronic control systems
make many types of systems global and make it possible to
sharply increase (by at least an order of magnitude) the
destructive potential of conventional weapons, bringing them
closer...to weapons of mass destruction in terms of effectiveness.
28
The effectiveness of precision-guided weapons in the Gulf War has caused
many to acknowledge that such a revolution has indeed occurred. The
effectiveness of modern weaponry is now limited more by the necessity for
adequate intelligence than by any other factor. Barry Watts, an author of the Gulf
War Air power Study, noted that the means of destruction have out paced the both
the means of command and control and detection capabilities, "If we know where
to aim, we can hit. But knowing where to aim remains difficult."29 The ability to
provide timely targeting data for military targets and identify critical components
of economic target sets now comprise the limiting factor in the overall
effectiveness of strike warfare.
The implications for intelligence of this "partial revolution" in which
weapon range and capability outstrip the means of detection is profound. Col A.
N. Zakharov, writing on the subject of the nature of future war in the Russian
journal Military Thought, eloquently describes this concept:
The... trend is dictated by the ever growing significance of
information collected in a timely manner on the target of effect to
ensure requisite weapon effectiveness. It signifies that achieving
success in operations will largely depend on the effectiveness of
combating reconnaissance and information systems...in planning
the enemy's defeat commanding generals and staffs must initially
must give priority to personnel and equipment employed for
28 Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V Ogarkov, : " The Defense of
Socialism : The experience of History and the Present Day", Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 May
1984, 2-3 (FBIS Soviet Union V.3 No. 91, R 19)
29 Barry D. Watts, "17 February 1993 SAIS Seminar on "The Revolution in Military
Affairs" p. 11
55
collection, transmission, processing and storage of information,
then to personnel and equipment employed for redistributing it
and combat equipment of command and control facilities; and
only then to weapons.
The necessity to provide intelligence information in support of operations
on both a regional and global scale is becoming vital to the conduct of high
technology warfare. Intelligence architecture and connectivity must be established
to allow the seamless fusion of both organic and non-organic information for the
operator.
An fundamental concern is the trade-off between timely and accurate
information. The changing nature of the threat from having a predominately
Russian-designed kit to heterogeneous mix of Western and Russian hardware
makes it imperative that intelligence collection systems be able to accurately detect
and identify any potential threat, regardless of national manufacture. This is
especially vital in the realm of ELINT correlation. Otherwise, the danger of
receiving "garbage at the speed of light" becomes acute and undermines the whole
concept of intelligence support.
With the advent of weapons whose single shot kill (SSK) probability
approaches unity, increasing emphasis is being placed on deception of intelligence
systems as the most effective way of preventing destruction by strike means. In
this regard, Iraq during the Gulf War seemed to have a degree of success in
confounding Coalition targeting. Russian sources credit Iraq with waging an
effective campaign of camouflage, concealment and deception, using hundreds of
fiberglass mock-ups of combat aircraft and missile launchers. They go so far as to
say that up to fifty percent of initial coalition airstrikes fell on false targets. 30
30 Col V. P. Chigak, "The Farst Lessons of the War," Voennaya Mysl, No 5, May 1991,
60-71, as translated in JPRS-UMT-92-002-L, 16 Jan 1992, p. 37
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While the Russians may be overstating the case, elements of the Iraqi
deception campaign were also noted by Western analysts. Barry Watts also points
to elements of this extensive Iraqi effort. For example, the nuclear fuel of the Al-
Tuwaitha Nuclear Power Plant was taken from the reactor and placed in a field
and covered with dirt, rendering this vital element invisible to coalition means of
detection.3 1 Future intelligence systems must have the ability to distinguish more
effectively between real and false targets.
Information war in the future, with the global diffusion of military
technology to regional actors, threatens to take on a less ,ne-sided nature than in
the Gulf War. A critical vulnerability of US intelligence means is reliance on a
vulnerable system of command, control, communication and intelligence (C31).
With regards to the Gulf War, a senior navy official stated that interference with
one ultra-high frequency satellite would have disrupted the flow of intelligence
information and changed the course of the war. 32 Moreover, the insatiable
intelligence requirements during the Gulf War made the use of commercial
satellite systems essential for the transmission of data-intensive imagery.33
The diffusion of advanced technology weaponry to regional actors
constitutes another danger. It is becoming increasingly possible to target
intelligence and communication centers with precision weaponry. For example,
Russia has developed and is placing into service a new version of the SCUD
missile system which both a terminal guidance capability allowing pinpoint
accuracy and an advanced conventional munitions warhead.3 4 While this system
has yet to be offered for export, the need for hard currency may see such systems
appear in the Third World before the end of the decade. Clearly, the need for
robust and redundant intelligence nodes and connectivity to ensure survivability
will become an increasingly vital concern.
However, operational intelligence support, must be able not only to prevail
in the demanding high technology warfare environment, but also in conflicts of
lesser intensity. If history can be a guide, conflict with low and mid-level
technology forces is more likely than conflict with high-technology regional
powers.
3 1 Barry Watts, p. l032 Campen, p. 61
33 Ibid., 60-61
34 Christopher Foss, "Latest 'Scud' Has Pinpoint Guidance," Jane's Defense Weekly, I
May 1993, p. 7
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This represents a fundamental difficulty for the intelligence community as
low technology conflict requires a different set of collection capabilities than does
high technology conflict. Assets such as HUMINT operatives and linguists play a
vital role in low intensity conflict. SIGINT and ELINT, may have little utility. In
the Gulf War, Iraqi SCUD missile launchers proved highly elusive because of a
the inability of such means as imagery, SIGINT or ELINT to track them
successfully. Much of the most useful information on these systems came from
HUMINT sources.35 In low intensity and insurgency conflict, HUMINT may be
the only effective means of intelligence gathering. Therefore, a healthy balance of
intelligence capabilities which can operate across the spectrum of conflict is
required to face an uncertain and constantly shifting threaL.
The requirement will remain not only for I&W, but for very detailed and
sophisticated intelligence analysis in support of operational and tactical forces.
One of the critical intelligence functions in the era of high-technology is
support in targeting. High-technology weapons tend to trade a lower warhead
size for increased accuracy and range. These weapons, therefore, depend on
extremely accurate locational data for the launch platform, and especially for the
aimpoint, in order to deliver the weapon to a critical point. Identification of the
latitude and longitude of target elements in a data base, however, is not sufficient.
What is even more important is knowledge of how the economy ind the armed
forces of a potential adversary function.
Clausewitz, influenced by the scientific theories of Isaac Newton, derived
the idea of a "center of gravity." Clausewitz identified the "center of gravity" of
the enemy as the critical element upon which to concentrate force in order to
ensure victory. One problem with this concept is that the "center of gravity" has
tended to be difficult to define, so difficult in fact, that it has often only been
identified after the conclusion of hostilities. A more modem scientific paradigm
can be taken from the field of cybernetics.
Cybernetics uses a complex chain of events, with each step precisely
defined, in order to accomplish a specific task. Modern economies and armed
forces also require a complex chains of events to function. With the loss of
specific links, the system will be degraded, or cease to function at all. Each
link in such a chain can be concretely expressed by the node which is provides
the function. Striking the proper nodes can break the critica! links in a
complex chain of events.
35 Col Alan D. Campen, "New Technology Alters Support to Intelligence," Signal, Oct
1992, p. 60
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Too often, the targeting focus has been on installations, rather than on a
systems approach. As a specific illustration, in an aircraft carrier's mission
planning center, one might hear the following comment used as the rationale for a
particular strike, "We are striking this airfield because it poses a threat to naval
forces operating in the area." Of course, this is only an informal statement, but
such a rationale will obscure important concepts, such as the system of which the
airfield is only a component part. Therefore, the wrong aimpoints will be chosen,
and the wrong weapons used. We must analyze how exactly an airfield constitutes
a threat to US forces. It is not some giant out of a children's fantasy book which
has the ability to roll up its runways, and wade out into the littoral to directly
threaten ships at sea.
It would have been better for the intelligence analyst to have said something
like, "Aircraft based at this airfield, when manned by pilots who are quartered in a
nearby building, and maintained by the troops who live in the barracks, and when
loaded with bombs or missiles from the ammunition dump down the road, and
when in receipt of orders coming through the communications net, and given
locational data from their intelligence center, and using the base's runways and
navigational aids, have the ability to attack our forces." It should be noted that any
of the elements identified in the preceding sentence could further be sub-divided
many times. If any of these elements are destroyed, the others need not be struck
at all. To do so would be redundant. What had been a search for an elusive"center of gravity" is replaced by a chain in which only a single link must be
broken.
In the past, this "chain" targeting principal has often been ignored. There is
a very strong temptation to strike a portion of all the elements. For hypothetical
example, in a large raid on an airfield, thirty percent of the aircraft are destroyed
on the ground, twenty percent of the pilots are killed, thirty percent of the
maintenance capacity damaged, and twenty-five percent of weapons stockpile
destroyed. Because no element has suffered greater than thirty percent attrition,
the enemy still should be able to generate seventy percent of the sorties that were
possible prior to the strike.
If targeting concentrates on a single critical element, such as ordnance, or
aircraft, or pilots, a greater percentage of that single element will be destroyed, and
the war could be waged much more efficiently. This same sort of targeting of
critical elements can be accomplished at the operational and strategic levels of
warfare. Specific industries or elements of the opposing army can be selected and
targeted.
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As a nation increases its own technical sophistication, its vulnerability to
this type of "chain" targeting similarly increases. In a sophisticated system, the
number of links between elements increases, and the amount of redundancy
decreases. The United States, as a nation reliant on high-technology, is probably
more vulnerable to this type of disruption than it realizes. During the Gulf War,
Iraq could make no viable attempt to strike the vulnerable points of the coalition
forces. Intelligence analysts should explore the vulnerability of potential enemy
nations to this new type of targeting and assist US planners in countering our own
similar vulnerabilities.
An important caveat for intelligence is that it is absolutely essential to
be able to accurately model the opposing nation's economy or armed force.
Miscalculations of how the enemy operates, and therefore, which elements are
critical will only lead to situations such as bombing the enemy's ball-bearing
plants, without realizing that he has stockpiled a year's production. It was
difficulty in modeling the economy of the USSR that defeated many attempts to
design nuclear economic-retardation and war-supporting industry targeting
packages.
It is tempting to be simplistic, and say that high-tech nations will always
easily defeat mid-tech nations, and mid-tech nations will defeat low-tech, etc., but
this is not always the case. A low-tech nation may be able to thwart a nation
which is overly reliant on high-technology systems. By dispersing forces, hiding
among the urban population, relying on cottage industries, and small arms, a low-
tech nation may be able to render long-range strike platforms useless, by creating
no critical nodes. Indeed, there are models of this in our own recent past.
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Chapter Four
Intelligence Organization and Policy Recommendations
I. Reorganization of the Intelligence Community
Refocusing the intelligence community in the wake of the realities of the
new world order will require significant reorganization. In addition to changing
the focus of the community, consolidation, more cross-component cooperation and
overall better management are needed to correct the inefficiencies that resulted
from the often uncoordinated growth of the intelligence community in the 1980s.1
Efforts aimed at consolidation and the creation of leaner, more efficient, more
capable intelligence agencies should be vigorously pursued in this era of declining
budgets.
Many such efforts at reorganization are underway or have already occurred.
One example is the creation of the Centralized Imagery Office (CIO) to pull
together imaging assets under a single roof, provide central direction, eliminate
duplication, and increase efficiency. 2  In the HUMINT realm,
reorganization/consolidation efforts include the Defense Intelligence Agency's
(DIA) plan to centrally direct all military HUMINT efforts. 3 This plan calls for
DIA to become the DOD HUMINT Manager to eliminate unnecessary duplication
of effort and increase information sharing. Reorganization efforts designed to
allow the intelligence community to make better use of open source information
are also a good idea. In 1992 Robert M. Gates, then-director of Central
Intelligence, appointed a open source coordinator to provide a focal point for
developing a solid open source intelligence program.4 This was a good first step
towards making the intelligence community smarter by making better use of an
additional source of valuable information at relatively low cost.
It is important to be at least a little suspicious about being able to "fix"
everything wrong with intelligence by bureaucratic reshuffling alone.
"Reorganization" is an oft used bureaucratic trick, a sort of Washington mantra,
chanted by the faithful when things don't seem to be working well. According to
1 Paula L. Scaiingi "U.S. Intelligence in an Age of Uncertainty: Refocusing to Meet the
Challenge," The Washington Quarterly 15, no. I winter 1992): p. 149.
2 "Defense Intelligence Rigs For Varied Global Roles," Signal 46, no. 12 (August 1992):
35; Loch K. Johnson, "Smart Intelligence," Foreign Policy (Winter 1992-93): p. 64.
3 LT Tom Wingfield, "ONI-65--Navy HUMINT Element," Intelligencer (Office of Naval
Intelligence Newsletter), (April 1993): p. 9.
4 Robert D. Steele, "Open Source Intelligence Clarifies Global Threats," Signal 47, no. I
(September 1992): p. 65.
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Dr. Roy Goodson, an Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown
University, the pending reorganization of the intelligence community is both
attractive and deceptive. 5 It offers allure because a substantial overhaul is tangible.
Reorganization "gives the sense of progress and a fresh start." He adds that the
"deceptive" part is that proposed changes may in fact have little impact on the
inner operations of the affected intelligence agencies.
According to Goodson, who all but dismisses organizational issues, the
critical imperative is to "attract fresh, insightful analysis." Nothing about
reorganizing will necessarily meet the imperative. Streamlined organizational
charts are not the same thing as streamlined organizational realities. It is
critical that any proposed organizational changes to the intelligence community
have something to do with what is really wrong. Rotating the tires on an
automobile may be a good idea, but will do nothing to fix a broken transmission.
Requisite structural changes to the intelligence community should be
carried out, however, a rapidly changing world and budgetary realities demand that
the intelligence community not waste time, effort and money on unnecessary
reshuffling where it is possible to meet the imperatives of the new world order by
having existing organizations to do a better job of what they are supposed to be
doing. It is critical to take advantage of existing expertise and data already
existing in the intelligence community.
An efficient reorganization of the intelligence community requires a
complete understanding of the full scope of what is already available from existing
agencies. There is no reason to create new levels of bureaucracies if a current
organization already has a handle on a problem. There is much discussion about
the need for intelligence organizations to shift their focus.6 There is little doubt a
major broadening of focus away from the Soviet Union is warranted.
The new era changes the information needs of the US Government and
serving these needs means the intelligence community must generate information
and analysis about new subjects for new consumers.7 However, much of what is
offered up as the "new focus" for intelligence, has actually been done all along.
5 "Critical Issue in Rehab Is Utility of the Product," Signal 46, no. 10 (June 1992): p. 103.
6 Robert H. Williams, "Intelligence Restructuring Sparks CIA, Hill Shoot-out," Signal 46,
no. 10 (June 1992): 101; Scalingi, p. 147.
7 Ernest R. May, "Intelligence: Backing Into The Future," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 3
(Summer 1992): p. 64.
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Tracking the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology has been a long standing
intelligence priority. It did not just recently occur to the intelligence community
that it might be a good idea to try to keep track of who might be working on
getting the bomb.
The intelligence community justifiably had a "Cold War preoccupation"
with the Soviet threat. The intelligence community was not, however, oblivious to
the rest of the world and non-Soviet threats. Third World threats understandably
received less focus during the Cold War than did the Soviet Union, but they
weren't ignored. The most threatening countries (North Korea, Libya, etc.)
received appropriate attention. The intelligence community's knowledge of these
countries was not perfect (nor will it ever be), but, it was adequate considering the
threat posed by the countries in question. The intelligence community needs to
build on what it knows, it is not starting from scratch.
Part of the reform package being considered is to bring in analysts from
many agencies (CIA, NSA and elsewhere) into a new autonomous Directorate for
Estimates and Analysis.8 This would in essence consolidate the intelligence
analysis function into a single organization. According to Senator David Boren,
Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee:
Spending billions of dollars on intelligence collection is useless if
the analysis of information is not both clear and objective. It
must also be the product of the best minds in the country in the
relevant fields, both inside and outside the government. 9
The creation of a single analytic organization is probably considered a good
move by those decision makers who insist on being presented with a consensus
opinion from the intelligence community. However, products expressing the
consensus view are usually marginal at best. Consensus within the intelligence
community works about as well as it does in Congress.
Overlapping analytic efforts and agencies is not necessarily a bad thing.
Commenting on this subject, Ernest R. May noted that, "For any example of
wasteful duplication, a counter example shows the value of competition." 10
Having the various intelligence agencies act as a sanity check on each other can be
very beneficial. It some cases it is vital. Competition can prevent intelligence
agencies being forced to produce skewed analysis in support of policy or
8 May, 68; David L. Boren, "The Intelligence Community: How Critical," Foreign Affairs
71, no. 3 (Summer 1992): p. 61.
9 Boren, p. 56.
10 May, p. 69.
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procurement. The independence of organizations such as the Office of Net
Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense is possible only if it has
competitive points of view available.
Being presented with differing reports from several agencies makes many
leaders uncomfortable because this forces them to act like leaders. Conflicting
reports mean they must pay more attention to the world situation and to
intelligence. It means they must be well enough informed to draw some of their
own conclusions. They must know which agency has a better track record. A
single analytic agency will also confer upon leaders the luxury of only having one
agency to blame when they don't have perfect information.
One advantage of a single analytical agency might be that there would be
fewer reports to read. A single product put out by a single agency is less of a
burden for busy people. One stop shopping for information saves time. It might
also save money. The duplication of multiple analytic agencies is more expensive,
but, according to May, "While competition does cost money, it does not cost
much."1 1 There is no reason to think that products composed using the
consensus approach of a single analytic agency would be any better than
several products from several agencies. On important issues, decision makers
will find the time to read multiple documents written by smart analysts. Very
often, the analyst who turns out to be right had an outlying opinion which was
quashed. There is almost always a person or group of people in any intelligence
organization that knows exactly what is going on with a given situation. Often,
however, they are ignored or silenced in the interest of more senior opinions.
Consensus has a frightening tendency to breed mediocrity and should probably
be avoided. This doesn't mean than various intelligence agencies should work in a
vacuum. None of the good ones do. Most anaiysts routinely confer with analysts
from other agencies and share information. They don't do it perfectly but they do
communicate, share ideas and cross-pollinate.
II. SYNERGISM
The intelligence community is large and overlapping. Streamlining the
intelligence community, although perceived as necessary, could be detrimental.
There are certain reasons for the overlap. Each service requires specific types of
support, and each intelligence agency serves its purpose. Now that the threat has
become less predictable and the possible threat areas more numerous, the
intelligence community can benefit from comparing notes.
11 May, p. 69.
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The general public does not understand the reasons for the overlap of
intelligence organizations. They see this overlap as "redundancy". For example,
the New York Times states, "The redundancy is especially pronounced in the
Pentagon, where each armed service and each unified command has its own
intelligence branch." 12 It would well serve the military intelligence community to
correct this inaccurate perception, or continue to suffer budget cuts along with the
overall defense budget unless this type of perception is corrected.
Greater cooperation, both internationally and domestically, could assist in
decreasing the US intelligence budget. Indeed, with the new ad hoc coalitions and
other international missions, the US intelligence community ought to have policies
for the sharing of information with new friends and former enemies. Cooperation
would also allow the intelligence community to compare analysis, support joint
efforts, and to reduce the probability of overlooking potential problems. However,
cooperative arrangements with international intelligence organizations lead to
external threats to the domestic intelligence organizations.
Assistant Professor James Wirtz of the Naval Postgraduate School lists four
types of external threats posed by other nation's intelligence organizations:
cooperation can breed to complacency; it can open the intelligence organization to
penetration by an adversary's agents; allies can exploit the relationship to conduct
espionage ainst their partners; and cooperation can be used for the purpose of
deception. IT
Domestically, better liaison between the intelligence agencies could
assist in areas where budgetary cutbacks have taken their toll. Better inter-
agency coordination of various intelligence programs could also ensure that
duplicity is not a problem. DIA has been charged with coordinating the
intelligence agencies within the DOD. It is important that DIA makes every effort
to first ensure that redundancy is not a problem in the DOD intelligence agencies,
and secondly to educate the public on the necessity of the existing DOD
intelligence structure and the increased need for budgetary support.
III. SPECIFIC PROGRAMS
Since no one intelligence discipline is capable of providing the entire scope
of newly focused intelligence requirements, the intelligence community needs to
take full advantage of the strong points of each collection method. The variety of
threats continues to grow, yet the defense intelligence community can expect
fewer resources. Regional conflicts, nuclear and conventional arms proliferation,
2INew York Times, p. A-10.13 Wirtz, pp. 250-251.
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international terrorism, drug trafficking and economic espionage all seem to be on
the rise at the same time the intelligence budget is decreasing. The intelligence
community will be expected to do more with less.
First, the fat needs to be cut. William Webster points to the days when over
85% of our resources were focused on the Soviet Union. Many of these resources
currently are being shifted from areas where they are no longer needed. This is
one of the most important areas which the intelligence community needs to
continue to work on. While it takes time to develop experts for new areas, most of
the basic analytical skills are transferable. The move to consolidate agencies in
order to avoid duplication will be the major way of accomplishing more with less.
However, the importance of providing decision makers with analysis from
different organizations should not be overlooked. Yet, in these days of fiscal
constraint this may be a luxury which the US can no longer afford. The
intelligence community would be better off relying on fewer exceptional analysts
then having numerous mediocre analysts. As was shown in the Gulf War, more
intelligence estimates, particularly when watered down, is not always better.
A. Capabilities Against Low-technology Adversaries
The US intelligence community uses extremely sophisticated collection
systems optimized for use against the Soviet Union and its allies. But a wider
spectrum of threats, many of which are low-technology, raises the question of how
useful will high-technology intelligence collection systems be against low-
technology targets. Does a sophisticated SIGINT capability have any utility or
applicability to the conduct of intelligence operations in a situation such as
Somalia? The exploitation of an enemy's electronic signals always requires his
cooperation. He must possess and utilize electronic systems in order for them to be
vulnerable to collection and exploitation. In a situation such as Somalia, the
enemy may not even have electronic communications systems. Even when the
enemy has such systems, he may not use them. In the Gulf War, a medium-
technology scenario, a lack of cooperation by the Iraqi military resulted in "limited
electronic warfare products." 14
Since classic, high-technology systems are of limited use in a low-
technology environment, other intelligence assets must fill the bulk of intelligence
collection requirements. 15 Tactical intelligence/SIGINT assets will be heavily
relied upon in a conflict with a low-technology threat. However, high-technology
14 Daniel F. Baker, 'Deep Attack: A Military Intelligence Task Force in Desert Storm,"
Military Intelligence (October-December 1991): p. 39.15 David B. Collins, "Military Intelligence in Low Intensity Conflict," Military
Intelligence (July-September 1991): p. 12.
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assets should be applied where they have some utility. Tactical assets such as
those used by Marine Corps and Army are likely to produce the highest payoffs.
An Army combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) battalion may be able to
outproduce the entire national system of collection. A single linguist with a man-
pack voice-intercept capability may provide all the SIGINT collection possible
against a low-technology adversary. A robust HUMINT collection capability will
also be essential against a low-technology adversary. The interrogation of enemy
prisoners of war (EPW) will be more than a vital source of intelligence
information; it may very well be the only source.
ELINT and SIGINT collection platforms need to be optimized for non-
Russian signals, especially tactical ELINT to support the real time needs of
operators in harm's way. Also required will be long duration maneuver capability
for IMINT collection systems for the added flexibility to meet regional
contingency tasking.
The almost total reliance on tactical assets for collection against a low-
technology adversary means that it will be vital to maintain strong tactical
intelligence capabilities. Tactical units in all services must be equipped with light-
weight, reliable, and rugged gear suitable for operation by small units and even by
a single individual.
Linguistics skills in an increasingly diverse array of languages are vital.
The services spend millions to train linguists but this money is largely thrown
away by an abysmal effort to maintaining highly perishable language proficiency.
The lack of effort in this regard hurt the United States in the Gulf War and will
hurt us again if it is not corrected. 16 It is a difficult problem and solvable only if
it is made it a high priority and money spent accordingly. For many languages, the
only solution is to conduct follow-up, in-residence training in the target country
immediately following graduation from language school. This is an expensive,
time-consuming process but one of the few ways to solve the problem.
An additional solution for creating a pool of accessible and qualified
linguists and area specialists for areas of the world not normally in the national
security focus is the development of a DOD-wide program similar to the Army's
Civic Affairs Program. This program uses reserve personnel with appropriate skills
who are trained and organized to move in and administer areas of occupation. A
similar, well-developed armed forces intelligence program could provide a pool of
area specialists and linguists available for use in areas which there is a shortage of
trained regular force personnel to handle an unforseen contingency.
16 Garry L. Smith, "The Army Foreign Language Problem: Strategies For Solution,"
Military Intelligence, (July-September 1992): p. 23.
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B. HUMINT
During the late 1970s, the CIA underwent a significant cutback in
HUMINT collection assets. The director of the CIA at that time placed a
significant emphasis on using more technical means of collection. By using
technical means to collect against the Soviet Union's capabilities, the US could
make plans to counter the Soviets based on a worst case scenario. This type of
planning is no longer possible due to budget constraints. Additionally, many of the
new--r threats, i.e. international terrorism, do not lend themselves to exploitation
by technical means.
Crucial information concerning regional conflicts needed by decision
makers frequently can only be derived via HUMINT. Therefore, the
intelligence community needs to conduct an overall examination of its capabilities
and shortcomings within each region and country of the world. By identifying
those countries where HUMINT is critical in providing intelligence, a concentrated
effort can be made to develop country specialist, linguist and networks.
Cooperation with allies is one means of doing more with less.
Many areas of the world such as the Middle East contain groups which are
inherently more difficult for the US to infiltrate. Yet, cooperation with allies may
still provide us with important intelligence information. Co-operative arrangements
might represent the most efficient method of rapidly gathering information about
issues, nations or regions of new interest to policy makers. Nevertheless,
intelligence collaboration has several drawbacks which must be considered.
Over reliance on information provided by partners can led to the
vulnerability of putting too much faith in the other parties information as well as
the susceptibility to having the ir~telligence cut off at a time when it is needed
most. By exchanging intelligence with other nations the possibility of penetration
by an adversary's agents is increased. Protection of sources also becomes more
difficult. The partner may try to take advantage of the collaboration to obtain
information about the country with which it is cooperating. Even when espionage
does not occur, information exchange often exceeds the bounds of formal and
informal agreements reached by intelligence organizations. And finally, the
partner may use the arrangement to pass deceptive information in order to obtain
some benefit. HUMINT has various limitations some of which are common to
other intelligence disciplines and some of which are unique. HUMINT requires
long lead times before any results are obtained. The recruiting, training and
development of area experts (including linguistic skills) who can successfully
establish networks within a country takes years. An expert who is able to
68
determine worthwhile information and validity of sources is crucial. Yet, this is
the key to obtaining valuable HUMINT. The political sensitivities of conducting
HUMINT often limit the amount and quality of HUMINT. Additionally, the
success of HUMINT collection often remains unknown to Congress and the
general public, making it difficult to justify the large expenditures required.
While HUMINT has the potential to provide vital intelligence to
decision makers facing a new threat, it should not be viewed as a panacea.
Decision makers often expect too much from HUMINT. There are certain things
that HUMINT just can't answer. Understanding the intentions of an
institutionalized decision making system can be difficult, but, to know a persons
intentions, particularly those of a person considered irrational, i.e. Saddam
Hussein, is often just not possible no matter how close HUMINT sources may be
to the person. Panamanian General Noriega's mistress could have been a
psychoanalyst working for the CIA and still not have been able to know what his
intentions were.
HUMINT assets should not be tasked when other intelligence sources can
be used (such as technical and open source). However, it will be important to
identify the areas where HUMINT is needed and then to develop the needed
expertise. For areas in which it is not practical to develop HUMINT assets, other
contingencies need to be established. Briefig and debriefing of scientific
sources and emigrants needs to be done by people familiar with the subject or
area.
There is also the need to educate the consumers to ask the right questions.
Commanders and decision makers need to be better informed on the capabilities
and limitations of HUMINT. Requirements must be current, specific and
prioritized. This will require articulating requirements well in advance due to the
long lead times required for HUMINT. It will also be necessary to establish better
procedures for analysis and dissemination of intelligence in order to fully take
advantage of the HUMINT collected. Closer cooperation between collectors and
analysts as well as closer cooperation between the various intelligence disciplines,
particularly in the area of cueing of assets, can also improve the quality of
HUMINT. The current coordination of the HUMINT efforts of the CIA and DOD




Presently, multi-national exercises are becoming commonplace with the
West, as well as with their former adversaries. Military exercises between NATO
and the Baltic States, Russia, or other East European countries provides an
opportunity to gain first-hand experience of how these former adversaries operate.
Ship visits between Russia and the US, and China and the US can provide
opportunities to gain information.
This type of intelligence collection requires different procedures than
intelligence efforts during the Cold War. Concerted efforts must be mad, to ensure
duplicity does not become a problem. This means of intelligence collection also
requires personnel specially trained to know what to collect and what is relevant
to the intelligence community.
Another aspect of intelligence cooperation is the sharing of intelligence
gathered by allies on joint exercises. This information can assist our efforts to fill
gaps we may have in our intelligence collection efforts. Joint exercises not only
provide the allies with information on former adversaries, but they also provide
our former adversaries with insight on our operations and our capabilities. We
may want to shape their perceptions.
The openness of these formerly "closed" societies changes the methods for
intelligence collection. Perhaps less emphasis can be placed on highly expensive
systems such as satellites. As a result of this openness, more data will be available
on an unclassified level. However, the quantity of data will be overwhelming and
require a means by which to rapidly evaluate and extract relevant information.
D. Foreign Material Exploitation
Foreign material exploitation is an area where the intelligence community
can earn its greatest savings. In understanding how a particular weapon system
works, it is important to know the actual performance capabilities of that system
and the tactics employed with it. Rather than developing intelligence estimates
and computer simulations of a system's capability, the intelligence community
can take advantage of the accessible equipment and test our systems against it.
The amount of money that could be saved by ridding DOD of intelligence
estimates, modeling and computer simulation contracts would be significant. The
reliability of the information from the Foreign Material Program would be far
greater.
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This is not to say that DOD's Foreign Material Program does not have its
own problems. Once again, the two most notable are inter-service cooperation and
overlap. These two factors lead to lost foreign material opportunities by one
service or another. Under a DIA directive, the Navy is responsible for undersea
and surface material; the Air Force focuses on airborne platforms and weapon
systems; and the Army is responsible for land-based platforms, anti-aircraft
artillery, surface-to-air missile systems, and land-based support equipment. Each
of the services further divides the responsibilities. This compartmentalizing of
exploitation efforts makes coordination even more complicated.
Another problem is that each service has overlapping requirements. The
Navy and Marine Corps have requirements for all three areas (surface and
undersea, airborne, and land-based). However, unless the other two services are
aware of these requirements, they may be overlooked. The compartmentalizing,
previously mentioned, only compounds the problem of disseminating service
requirements.
DIA is responsible for coordinating the Foreign Material Program for DOD.
However, in some cases, a particular service is contacted for exploitation
opportunities. This circumvents the usual change for tasking and requirements. If
formal lines of communications existed between the services' foreign material
exploitation divisions and if these communication links were utilized on a regular
basis, the possibility of missing an exploitation opportunity would be greatly
reduced.
Funding limitations also affect the development of new tactics against
newly acquired foreign weapons systems. In other words, it is not enough to
exploit by learning the capabilities of developed foreign hardware, it is also
necessary to reverse the downward trend in tactical development and evaluation
resources so that forces in the fleet or in the field will have the proper response to
the recently acquired hardware.
Finally, funding is probably the greatest limiting factor. Until recently,
acquisition of foreign material was highly expensive. This is now changing.
Cooperation between foreign countries has increased, and the expenses of testing
this type of equipment has been reduced. However, more funding should be
directed to testing against actual equipment rather than costly simulators or
hybrids. This thinking needs to change, and with that change in thinking, we need
to increase the funding for the foreign material.
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E. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
The advent of the computer and the information age, coupled with the
countries which were previously closed to Western scrutiny represent new realities
which require a shift in the way the intelligence community does business. The
information explosion has resulted in the availability of a multitude of
unclassified, open sources of information which can be used to great advantage
by the intelligence community. According to Nina J. Stewart, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures:
The rapid-fire globalization of economies and information,
combined with the internationalization of private business has
created a level of exchange, the fluidity of which left the
intelligence community capabilities in the dust .... The multimedia
explosion in many instances has either taken the place of our
intelligence network or imply outclassed it. I7
In actuality, the intelligence community has long made use of open source
data, albeit perhaps not full use. A great deal of open source information is
incorporated (fused with classified source material) into classified analysis.
Sources routinely used include the various Jane's Information Group publications,
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (IBIS) reporting, trade journals, and
others.
The utility of such previously explored open-source materials, such as
literature evidence, however, must be evaluated now that more data is available.
For example, after years of analysis of Soviet open-source literature evidence, we
are told that none of this was useful in predicting Soviet behavior! 18 On the other
hand, projects to look at open-source information during the Law of the Sea
negotiations were much more useful.
However, to fully exploit and take advantage of the opportunities
afforded by open source information will require the intelligence community to
make mind set and organizational changes which will allow full exploitation of
open sources. Robert D. Steele has suggested that open OSINT has generally
received short shrift in the past by the intelligence community. Steele notes,
however, that OSINT:
17 "The Changing Intelligence and Security Environment," Defense Issues 7, no. 2, p. 1.
18 FN. Alexi Arbatov, "The Soviet Union, Naval Arms Control in the Norwegian Sea,"
Europe and Naval Arms Control in the Gorbachev Era, ed. by Andreas Furst, Volker
Heise, and Steven E. Miller, New York, NY: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1992, pp. 46-50.
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...offers the potential of illuminating most of the threats that will
confront the United States through the balance of the 1990s.
Once known as scholarship, journalism or investigation, OSINT
is finally coming into its own. It provides a remedy for those
needing analysis of threats for which the existing collection and
production capabilities are unsuited" 19
Senator David Boren has called for the intelligence community to improve
the quality of analysis performed by intelligence agencies by making better use of
open source information and by being more interdisciplinary, with more use made
of reports from commercial and political officers overseas. 20 OSINT provides a
wide variety of information that previously would have been difficult if not
impossible for even highly place HUMINT sources to collect. Reporters and
their cameras are in interesting places at interesting times. They have incredible
access to leaders, high government officials and "the man in the street" and quite
often scoop the intelligence system.
Kenneth E. deGraffenreid has commented that the intelligence community's
new emphasis presents a much more difficult collection and analytic task. At the
same time, requirements are continuing to expand and now include whole new
target areas. 2 1 The demands placed upon the intelligence community are greater
than ever at a time when its budget is declining. OSINT can be of tremendous
help in meeting the challenge of having to do more with less.2 2 Tapping into open
source data bases, publications and analysis offers large payoffs for relatively low
costs. The cost to purchase open source data is a fraction of the cost to produce
original source classified material which may be only incrementally better.
For many of the new issues which the intelligence community is focused
upon, much information is available in open sources. According to Ernest R. May:
19 Steele, p. 65.
20 Boren, p. 56.21 "Intelligence Threat Changes Require Sharp U.S. Actions," Signal 45, no. 4
(December, 1990): p. 67.
22 Johnson, p. 54.
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For new issues much information is in open sources. Much
analysis is done outside the government. Future intelligence
officers will more often have to specify the increment in
understanding that secret intelligence provides. Decision makers
will want to be told tersely and exactly what is not in the New
York Times or Cable News Network.2 3
Robert D. Steele has noted that because of the intelligence community's
prior scrutiny of the Soviet Union, it is lacking in its capability to follow lesser
threats such as drug cartels, terrorists and nations involved in unscrupulous
economic and technology competition. Steele suggests that OSINT is a fast,
inexpensive and effective way for the intelligence community to get up to speed
in these areas. 24
An example of open source analysis performed outside the government into
an area of immediate concern to US policy makers are two projects underway at
the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS). The Monterey Institute is
currently running two large database-oriented non-proliferation projects, the
Emerging Nuclear Suppliers Project (ENSP) and the International Missile
Proliferation Project (IMP). These projects produce valuable analysis by tracking
vendor-consumer transactions of target materials.
Such projects, whether conducted by academic institutions, business service
organizations or the media, can be of tremendous help to the analytic efforts of the
intelligence community. All can at least provide supplemental sources of
information to analysts and there may be some products which are good enough to
replace more expensive efforts within the intelligence community.
23 May, p. 70.
24 Steele, p. 65.
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Ernest May's article also discusses *-sues of classification, clearance and
dissemination and notes that:
In the past secrecy has limited the usefulness of intelligence .... If
the ultimate actors are local law enforcement officials or bankers
or businessmen or doctors or scientists not even in government
employ (perhaps hot even US nationals), effective dissemination
is going to require new rules. That may mean new statutes.25
May's concerns show another way in which open source information can be
valuable. Data bases and analysis performed using open sources of information
can be readily disseminated and released without all the classification and
handling constraints and expense associated with classified information. The
requirement for unclassified sources of intelligence materials will be especially
critical during the increasing number of coalition campaigns such as peacekeeping
missions. Many of these will involve US and Russian or other former "enemy"
forces where full disclosure of information derived from classified sources may be
inappropriate.
It is important to note that OSINT, while an important addition to
intelligence collection and a vital source of information that may not be available
from classified means of collection, is not perfect. To use OSINT effectively,
particularly at the operational level, will require considerable processing and
screening by larger intelligence organizations. Simple dissemination of raw data
will not suffice. Too much information that can't be scrutinized is the same as no
information. Robert D. Steele defines OSINT as "coherent analysis reflecting
access to multimedia open sources."'2 6
Reporters and media analysts have no better track record than their
counterparts in the intelligence community, and media reporting can be the source
of a lot of nonsense. OSINT, like any other intelligence source, is not always
accurate. It takes sharp analysts to tell the nonsense from good information,
especially on the margin. Intentional injection of disinformation in open source
material is an old ploy and must always be corsidered when using OSINT derived
information. Another consideration when using OSINT from media sources is that
intelligence analysts will have to be aware of the media's agenda. Truth is not
always the product being sold and much of what is news is also part
entertainment. Intelligence analysts will always need to be aware of this and avoid
being taken in by exploding pick-up trucks and the like.
25 May, p. 72.
26 Steele, p. 65.
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Legal Issues are very problematic and some new legislation will be
required cpncerning the intelligence oversight laws which prohibit spying on US
citizens. Legitimate open source information processed into OSINT may no
longer be legal if it concerns US citizens. Multinational corporations are
especially problematic. How do you handle a US citizen corporate officer or
scientist working for a foreign corporation? This is a problem for the lawyers but
it has yet to be resolved and until it is it represents a serious limitation upon the
intelligence communities use of open source information for intelligence
purposes.
Although the collapse of the Soviet Union has opened up this formerly
closed area, it still is far from being as transparent as the West. Commenting on
the greater access to the former Soviet Union, Loch Johnson has noted that:
...openness is a relative matter, and the upper echelons of the new
governments continue to be quite secretive by Western standards.
The task of deciphering the intentions of rival newly independent
states' political figures poses a major intelligence challenge. 2 7
OSINT can never replace collection via national technical means and no
knowledgeable person would suggest that it can. Fusion of multi-source
intelligence data is the only way to reliably operate. No competent analyst
would completely trust any single source of data if he can help it. OSINT should
become another, no less vital source in the intelligence data fusion process.
Robert D. Steele has made several policy recommendations concerning
what it will take to "cultivate and manage" OSINT in an era of declining
budgets. 2 8 According to Steele a systematic approach to OSINT as a separate
discipline is required. He suggests that this effort "is best undertaken by a national
organization or consortium independent of the intelligence community." Steele
feels that having a central focal point for OSINT will ensure the government
works in partnership with the private sector. Treatment of OSINT as a separate
intelligence discipline is the key to allowing the intelligence community to take
full advantage of OSINT.
A separate agency to centrally manage OSINT is warranted. At a minimum
a separate directorate within an existing organization (CIA or DIA) seems
necessary. But the validity of Steele's recommendation for this body to exist
outside of the intelligence community is nonsensical. The intelligence community
27 Johnson, p. 55.
28 Steele, p. 65.
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will be extremely reluctant to spend a great deal of money or to cooperate fully in
an area which it doesn't control. Additionally, the best analysis is that derived by
the fusion of multiple sources, including OSINT. A centralized OSINT clearing
house or agency which is not a part of the intelligence community is less likely to
facilitate the inclusion of OSINT data into analysis performed by the intelligence
community.
IV. INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS
In general, a multi-polar world is theorized to be politically more stable
than a bi-polar world.29 However, the move from the highly intense environment
of the Cold War to the present relaxed situation has given the general public the
impression there is no longer a threat to the US. Therefore, the opinion is that
there is no longer a need for a large defense budget or a large intelligence budget.
Perhaps there is no longer as great of a need for the highly expensive systems to
conduct a global conventional or nuclear war, but we are still deeply involved in
international politics. The rest of the world sees the US as the leader. We will
still conduct military operations, and they will require intelligence efforts, though
in very different from the cold war scenarios. We must better predict possible
scenarios where US and allied forces will be involved. Once a situation arises
requiring US intervention, the intelligence community must be able to provide
accurate intelligence to aid military commanders in the successful accomplishment
of their assigned missions and to minimize the number of causalities and losses.
Intelligence cooperation is probably our best effort to increase capabilities while
the budget decreases. But we must be aware of the possible drawbacks of
intelligence cooperation. We must take the necessary safeguards to protect our
systems and sources. We must also improve the ability to provide sanitized
information to potential allies.
No amount of intelligence community reorganization and policy changes
will eliminate the problem of a policy maker who either will not avail himself of
existing information or becomes involved in the intelligence process only when he
engages in after-the-fact criticism of how intelligence failed to live up to his
expectations. Dysfunctional consumer behavior is one of the most critical
problems in the intelligence community. 3 0 It is easier for leaders to cite
intelligence failures rather than their own inabilities or failures within their own
organizations.
29 Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemnma in Alliance Politics", World Politics, Vol 36,
No 4, July 1984, p. 462.
30 See Mark M. Lowenthal, "Tribal Tongues: Intelligence Consumers, Intelligence
Producers," The Washington Quarterly 15, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 157-168; Johnson, p.
61.
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Unrealistic expectations on the part of the consumer are very problematic.
Intelligence, even when working well, can never provide perfect information about
enemy capabilities and intentions. If it could, high school students would suffice
as policy makers and war fighting commanders. Having an efficient, well-
functioning intelligence system will never eliminate the requirement for US policy
makers, decision makers, and war fighting commanders to be personally smarter,





"The ultimate object of Intelligence is to enable action to be optimized."1
Although the proposed recommendations in the previous chapters seek to optimize
the ability of military intelligence to support national security objectives, various
obstacles will, of course, have to be surmounted to implement this fundamental
change in the focus of US military intelligence. While some of these impediments
may be overcome through the implementation of concrete, prescriptive measures,
others will require transformations in traditional beliefs and intellectual concepts.
Residual cultural elements of the Cold War mentality in military intelligence,
wide-ranging political considerations and pitfalls, future budgetary and personnel
cuts, and general bureaucratic inertia are some of the potential problems that must
be mastered for any deep seeded change to occur in US intelligence priorities.
IL Cultural Impediments
A. Cold War Mentality
Among the most significant impediments to change within the US military
intelligence community are those obstacles associated with the residual effects of
long term focus on the capabilities of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This
mindset, caused by over 45 years of focus on a monolithic threat, has resulted in a
continuing emphasis on analysis of former Soviet and East Bloc countries, a
continuing analytical and academic focus towards Europe, a preoccupation with
purely military capabilities rather than broader relative military potential, and the
desire to identify easily-definable, military threats to American national security.
Because most "...intelligence managers still believe that foreign military
force still offers the greatest potential danger to the United States...",2 Russia, and
other former Soviet states which possess large c,-nventional military assets,
continue to be viewed by many as the major threa& to American national security.
Additionally. because Russia is the only nation possessing a direct, large-scale
nuclear delivery capability against the US, the continued tracking of Russian
nuclear assets and developments remains a strategic priority of many American
policy makers.
1 R.V. Jones, "Intelligence and Command", in Handel, Leaders and Intelligence, p. 288.
2 Loch K. Johnson, "Smart Intelligence." in Foreign Policy, No. 89, Winter, 1992-1993,
p. 61.
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Unit tracking and equipment analysis of these Cold War adversaries
continues to occupy large portions of the US intelligence effort despite the
growing importance of military deployments within the Third World and the
increasing number of countries which export significant military hardware. While
a majority of intelligence managers may tacitly acknowledge the general demise of
the Soviet bloc as a coherent and unified threat, over half of all US intelligence
collection and production assets continue to focus on the analysis of Russian, and
other former Soviet component nations', military capabilities.
B. European "focus"
Associated with this focus on former East Bloc nations is a general focus of
analytical effort toward Europe. Long standing historical, cultural, and economic
links with Europe have resulted in a traditional academic and political focus
towards Europe by the US. While the continued tracking of European
developments remains vital to the protection of America's global interests, the
general political instability of many Third World regions, the booming economic
growth of the Pacific Rim, and the surge of technology transfers in recent years all
suggest the need to increase analytical education about these areas and to track
ongoing developments in other parts of the world besides Europe.
The American emphasis on the academic study of developments in Europe
is the obvious result of long-term ties to the nations and people of that continent:
Cultural and historical ties from colonial times and the massive European
emigration in the 1800s; long standing economic links throughout the periods of
mercantilism, industrialism and the nuclear age; and the continuing political bonds
between Western countries has resulted in intellectual and academic focus on
Europe that has predominated university structures, scholarly pursuits, and
databases throughout American history. In the wake of World War II and
concurrent with the ensuing Cold War, this European focus was intensified to
underscore the potential threat offered by a powerful Soviet adversary.
Although 45 years of extensive intelligence focus towards Europe has
resulted in numerous "European experts" and an extensive database regarding
military capabilities in this area, data and ;xpertise for many nations in other parts
of the world are often sketchy or non-existent. The education and database
building stage required to overcome this dearth of information about areas outside
of Europe will be a costly and time-consuming prospect for the US Various
collection resources, including open source assets, will have to be repositioned to
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examine these other regions. Academic and scholarly study of the Third World by
military strategists, will have to be stimulated and the education of new "experts"
will have to be undertaken to ensure that the intelligence community has
competent people providing key assessments of foreign actions.
C. Worst-Case Scenarios vs Broad View of Capabilities
Another lingering element of the Cold War way of thinking can be seen in
the continuing emphasis placed on military capabilities rather than on national
capabilities or relative military potential. Although American analysts had
successfully assessed the pure military capabilities of the large conventional and
nuclear military forces which the Soviet Union possessed, the US was much less
successful in determining the Soviet ability to support that large military structure;
or in determining the intent of the Soviet leadership to use the conventional and
nuclear military might that nation possessed. While assessing a nation's ability to
support its military structure and assessing a potential enemy's intentions are much
more difficult than telling what hardware that country possesses, these assessments
are obviously of much more importance to a national decision maker since they
determine the use of this hardware. While a country may possess sophisticated
weapons systems and a large conventional military, the lack of proper
technological training and education, an absence of natural resources, a poorly
developed economic infrastructure, and an ineffective organization of leadership
would all limit that nation's ability to use any of these military assets in either a
defensive or aggressively offensive capacity..
The reasons for this continuing "worst-case" analysis are two-fold. First,
worst-case scenario analysis of a potential enemy's military capabilities often
forms the basis of defense programming and equipment purchases in the US 3 To
justify large force structures and costly weapons developments, which might
legitimately be needed to respond to any number of world crises, to government
funding bodies such as Congress, the US military has traditionally been compelled
to use capabilities assessments as an illustration of the strength of potential foes.
Second, while leaders may be "...more inclined to listen to intelligence experts on
subjects such as scientific intelligence and economic intelligence and other more
specialized areas in which they have no expertise," 4 many military leaders prefer
to base their decisions on the "hard" intelligence offered by capabilities studies
rather than the generally more ambiguous and less defined "soft" intelligence of
economic assessments or political intentions analysis.
3 Ibid, pp. 54 and 62.
4 Laquer, A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence 1941-1945 (New
York: Harcourt Brace Javanovitch, 1982), p. 92 footnoted in Handel, Leaders and
Intelligence, p. 8.
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Although capabilities studies still offer a baseline understanding of foreign
military potential, these studies must be balanced with the context offered by
broader "soft" intelligence. The shift in analysis from military capabilities to
military potential or national power projection will not be an instantaneous
intellectual transition for the intelligence community. In the summer of 1992, Rep.
Dave McCurdy (D-OK), chairman of the House Intelligence Panel, commented
that "The point is, if your focus has been on the Soviet military capability or the
Iraqi military capability, it is going to take a different kind of analyst who
understands technology trends in the Asia rim or Europe or elsewhere. I am
amazed how little the American people know about economics, whether they be
policy makers in Congress, in the media and, I think, within government itself.
The intelligence community will need a lot of help."5
Finally, the general political and military desire for an easily identifiable
threat, like that present during the days of the Cold War, also inhibits the adoption
of a more comprehensive approach to intelligence. While the presence of a heavily
armed, ideologically hostile adversary during the Cold War provided military and
political planners with a recognizable threat to national security, the inherent
ambiguous nature of economic and technologically based threats will make it
much more difficult for the intelligence community to convince national decision
makers of the validity and importance of key assessments. Additionally, the
indications and warnings provided by these "soft" intelligence assessments will be
much more difficult for US leaders to translate into defense programs or security
strategies.
5 Rogert H. Williams, "Congress Reserves Option to Reorganize Intelligence", in Signal,
August, 1982, p. 33.
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II Political Impediments
Although "ideal intelligence work would be objective, autonomous and free
of political pressures,"6 a wide range of political considerations hinder progressive
innovations in US intelligence. Perhaps the most central political impediment to
effective change by the US intelligence community is the lack of a clearly defined
national security policy. 7  By defining those issues which the government
considers to be of national interest, this stated policy forms the foundation for all
intelligence analysis by the US
Because of a lack of long term political consistency between various
administrations and an ensuing inconsistency in the interpretation of national
interests, the concise declaration of national security policy by each successive
administration becomes a fundamental requirement in the intelligence community's
ability to watch important issues. While Republicans under the Bush
administration may have promoted the ideology that government had no place in
the international economic and commercial arena, foreign countries have long
supported economic intelligence efforts and many Democrats in the US believe
"that we must have a trade and technology policy." 8
Until a well defined national security policy, reflective of the ;,resent
national leadership's intent, is issued, American intelligence will be forced to
simply function in a reactive mode to the latest political pronouncements of the
country's decision makers and will waste substantial effort in tracking issues which
are of little consequences to our influence of policy decisions.
The intense political focus on domestic issues may offer another
impediment to fundamental changes in intelligence. The emphasis by p iicy
makers on internal concerns within the US may suggest a new political and
intellectual isolationism that will limit support for the broadening of intelligence
concerns and analysis. While the emphasis of domestic issues may, in fact, be a
necessary requirement for the present, it must be remembered that much of this
internal attention will come at the expense of analysis of the international arena.
One overtly restrictive political impediment to change in American
intelligence is the push for the imposition of clearly defined legal charters which
would govern the context of analysis by national intelligence agencies. Promoted
6 Handel, War, Strategy, and Intelligence, (Tatowa, New Jersey: Frank Cass and Co.
Ltd., 1989), p. 189.
7 James H. Babcock and Peter C. Oleson, "Intelligence Concerns for the 1990's," in
Signal, Vol. 43. No. 10, June, 1989, p. 35.
8 Williams, p.33.
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by such political leaders as Rep. McCurdy, these charters would concisely
delineate the areas of analysis and responsibilities for member organizations of the
national intelligence community. 9 These legalistic limitations on what intelligence
organizations could and could not analyze would serve to narrow, rather than
broaden, the scope of intelligence, would restrict the ability of agencies to share
information, and would generally decrease capability to fuse intelligence
assessments from various agencies. Although the overall intent of this guidance
may be the movement of intelligence agencies towards change, the imposition of
prescriptive and restrictive regulations by transitory civilian leaders rarely
produces long term effects in military organizations. 10 Instead, restrictive charters
generally inhibit innovation and limit the abilities of military leaders to exercise
individual management, guidance, or decision making within their commands.
As previously noted, the relatively short tenure of most political office
holders will have a detrimental effect on efforts to develop a fundamental change
in the outlook of the intelligence community. While the support and guidance of
key political appointees and leaders is vital to the success of military innovations,
these changes invariably require much more time for their complete
implementation than is allowed for by the period of any national political
administration. Policy differences between successive military, legislative and
executive leaderships will overtly hamper the ability of any organization to
execute long-term changes.
The inherent bureaucratic hierarchy associated with the US government will
provide yet another political obstacle to changes in the approach to American
intelligence efforts. The lack of centralized control over the intelligence
community and political infighting between various agencies will impede the
progress of any transformation in intelligence. While the Director of Central
Intelligence may be the nominal head of the US intelligence community, the
control of budgetary and personnel assets, as well as the Constitutional seniority,
of the Secretary of Defense, makes that cabinet office much more important to the
overall direction of the nation's intelligence effort. This ambiguous relationship
often leads to a lack of clear direction and focus in national intelligence analysis.
Additionally, bureaucratic power struggles between various intelligence agencies
contribute to the political obstacles that will have to be overcome to implement the"good idea". Competition for political influence, intellectual acceptance, and a
greater percentage of diminishing pool of fiscal and personnel assets all contribute
to this sense of rivalry.
9 Ibid, p. 32.
10 Picket, "Airland Battle", Helicopters and Tanks: Factors Influencing the Rate of
Innovation", p. 4. Also Stephen Peter Rosen, "New Ways of War", in International
Security, Vol. 13, No 1, Summer, 1988, p. 135.
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IV. Budget and Personnel Cuts
Some of the most obvious difficulties that will have to be overcome
are the cuts in operating budgets and personnel assigned to various billets
throughout the national military intelligence structure. Most US legislators
have shown a determined skepticism for continued high intelligence
budgets. 1 1  As long ago as 1989, then-DCI William Webster noted that,
"There has been a dramatic increase in the number and diversity of subjects
the intelligence community now is required to address, the number of
consumers who use our product and the resources we need to provide what
is needed for." 12
Despite the fact that the demise of the Soviet Union merely expanded
the field of view and the number of consumers for intelligence since
Webster's tenure, intelligence budgets have consistently fallen. The national
intelligence budget for fiscal year 1993 was cut by $1.5 billion, about 5% of
the yearly cost. 13 Added to this general cut in the intelligence budget are
the broad effects of the various cuts in military budgets. Because the
Department of Defense, individual services, and theater commands all
exercise some control over their separate budgets, the intelligence assets
which they possess will obviously be effected by fiscal cuts to those separate
commands.
Reductions in the number of billets within the national intelligence
community and personnel assigned to those billets will be another area of
diminishing resources. Billet cuts within the intelligence community of 12%
from the present number of positions are targets by 1997.14 While this
slash in the structural aspects of intelligence manpower will have an overt
effect on personnel resources, hiring freezes general cuts in the civil service,
and decreased intelligence training for civilian analysts will exacerbate the
effects of these billet reductions. Additionally, downsizing by the military
services will further limit the number of intelligence personnel available for
assignment to these billets. Individual service beliefs in the usefulness of
dedicated intelligence professionals and the applicability of assigning these
personnel to external intelligence agencies will have a profound effect on
service commitment to the evolving intelligence structure.
1 Johnson, p. 53
12 William H. Webster, "The Intelligence Community's Mission in Today's World," in Signal, Vol 44, No.
1, September, 1989, p. 38.1 3Williams, p. 32.
14 Johnson, p. 62.
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Faced with these declining assets, some defense analysts have noted that,
"Given the consistency of intelligence requirements, valid requirements for the
1990s may well exceed the capabilities of the intelligence community." This point
was emphasized to Pacific theater senior intelligence officers in March 1992 when
the theater intelligence production center briefed that, "Theater intelligence assets
are tasked to the saturation level at a time when the overt military threat to US
security is at the lowest level since the end of the Second World War." 15 Given
these apparent inadequacies in the intelligence community's ability to meet all
intelligence requests, "The management challenge for senior intelligence officials
will be to decide what will not be accomplished and weigh the consequent risk
accurately to minimize its potential impact." 16
V. BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA
Within the intelligence community and the individual military services,
various factors of bureaucratic inertia will contribute to the widespread resistance
to implementation of fundamental; changes in intelligence. Reliance on traditional
missions and methodologies, failure to recognize the value of innovation, service
rivalries, and the inherent resistance to change within bureaucracies may act to
intensify opposition to the "good idea"
The reliance on traditional missions, doctrine, and tasks may be one of the
most fundamental; bureaucratic obstacles to innovation.1 7 Because these
traditional roles have often been the very basis of an organization's existence, any
change to these roles may be perceived as an attack against that whole
organization or the personnel livelihood of all members of that organization. In the
case of military intelligence, this opposition to change would therefore be present
in both intelligence organizations and the individual military services While the
rigid adherence to accepted procedures and doctrines may allow for the competent
completion of the traditional missions, this approach fails to recognize changes in
the operating environment and denies the possibility of innovation to meet those
changes. 18
The failure, within a bureaucratic organization, to recognize the overall
value of any fundamental change will also serve as an impediment to change.
Although most bureaucratic organizations welcome changes that serve to fix
15 JICPAC briefing, Pacific Intelligence Board, March 1992.
16 Babcock and Oleson, p. 37.
17 Vincent Davis, The Politics of Innovation Patterns in Navy Cases, (Denver: University
of Denver Press, 1967) p. 38.18 Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1963), P. 246.
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irritating problems, expand influence, or provide some other benefit to its
members, the innate advantages of any innovation will have to be clearly
understood before it can be accepted by that organization. The positive results of
an increased emphasis on the element of the "good idea" will have to
overwhelmingly outweigh the effects of continued reliance on the old way of
doing business.
Service and agency rivalries, and rivalries between various functional
branches of the same service or intelligence organization, will still present another
hurdle to this fundamental transformation in intelligence. Competition for program
funding and personnel assets may lead any of these bureaucracies to ignore the
broad based benefits of the "good idea" in favor of the promotion of their
individual agencies. While the recommended reorganization and refocusing of US
intelligence would require a change to the entire intelligence community, attempts
to increase organizational influence over this innovation or to promote alternate
ideas will limit the inclusive qualities inherent with these recommendations.
Finally, the very nature of bureaucracies, especially those in a federal
democratic republic, connotes a resistance to change. The existence of prescribes
organizational rules and policies means that any attempts at innovation will
naturally involve the rewriting of these regulations. Further, because these rules
are often established by a relatively slow moving and incremental political
process, any changes to standard operating procedures will have to initiated by
people who break the rules or by innovators in powerful positions. 19
VI. PRINCIPLES OF SUCCESSFUL INNOVATION
Despite the apparent difficulties of overcoming the aforementioned
impediments, numerous successful innovations have occurred in the US military
and bureaucracies in the past century. Traditional ways of thinking have been
changed to meet new requirements, political roadblocks have been sidestepped,
and financial constraints have been overcome to affect fundamental
transformations in the character, mission, and doctrine of various aspects of the
military and government. "The particular problem facing men and women involved
in the study of modern politics is how to get bureaucracies to innovate." 20
Although the identification of specific criteria for implementing the proposed
recommendations is outside the scope of this work, certain broad principles of
successful innovation may be discussed.
19 Pickett, p. 4.
20 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modem Military,
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 1.
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First, the need for change has to be realized. This does not mean, however,
that defeat in war or the failure of an existing capability has to occur. 2 1 Typically,
"...perceptions of change in the structure of the international security environment
have been the source of such innovation." 2 2 The obvious demise of the Soviet
Union, the growing US involvement in regional crises of the Third World,
problems of nuclear proliferation, and the realities of a global economy all provide
concrete examples of recognized changes in the strategic environment. While
military intelligence budget and personnel cuts have already evolved as reactive
measures to these changes, the methods and focus of intelligence has thus far
failed to similarly evolve.
After recognition of this change in the strategic setting has occurred, the
next logical step in this process of innovation is the development of the innovative
concept itself. New requirements, missions, and capabilities must all be succinctly
identified to meet the inherent deficiencies between the old methodologies and the
new situation. This may involve missions "...in areas that... units have not
traditionally been required to fight or engage the enemy" 2 3 or requirements of
analysis that were outside the conventional purview of particular organizations.
Initially, the development of an innovation inay be seen as a more effective way of
meeting an established task or mission.24 In other cases, this innovation may be
presented as a new capability. While the broad concepts of a good idea may be
sufficient to start some changes, the redefinition of cri.";cal military tasks through
the formal development of new doctrine will eventually be necessary.2 5
Within the military, the presence of a dedicated innovation advocate has
been a key factor in the implementation of change. While this advocate is often not
the originator of the "good idea", he is a dedicated and zealous proponent of the
concepts offered in the innovation who seeks to bring about change for the overall
good of the organization. 26 This military innovator is usually a mid-grade officer
(0-4 to 0-6) who has been successful in his career thus far, is little concerned with
the potential impact of his advocacy on his future career pattern, and expects to be
successful in implementing the change. Additionally, this innovator is a person
who is respected by traditional military standards for their success in operating
"the old way" and who may now be viewed as someone attempting to correct
deficiencies.
21 Rosen, New Ways of War, p. 135.
22 Rosen, Winning the Next War, p. 57.
23 Pickett, p. 1.
24 Davis, p. 37.
25 Thomas C. Hone and Mark D. Mandeles, "Interwar Innovation in Three Navies",
Naval War College Review, 40, No. 2, (Spring 1987), p. 71.
26 Davis, pp. 33-35.
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These advocates must gain substantial support for their idea to implement
any fundamental change, however. This first step in this search for support is the
promotion of an intellectual change within the effected community. This
ideological struggle helps to redefine traditional values and establishes a "new
theory of victory." 27 Support is most often gained among the advocate's peers first
and then sought among senior military leaders in key positions of influence. 2 8
While support from top civilian leadership may be helpful in the early stages of arn
innovation,2 9 the lack of long term, consistent support from a transient political
office holder may hamper the program.30 Consistent top level military support,
however, offers the opportunity to begin the implementation of concrete measures
to support the innovation.
The establishment of new organizations, the selection and training of
personnel, and the establishment and protection of appropriate career patterns in
support of this innovation must all be explored to ensure the realization of
change. 3 1 While military leaders may support a particular innovation, other
leaders within the same service or organization will, out of their own convictions,
invariably try to cling to established procedures and missions by undermining the
efforts to enact change. Only by the formal protection of concrete changes can the
innovation come to fruition.
A final step in the implementation of any innovation is the need for
experience, experimentation, and measures of that innovation's effectiveness. The
practices and operating methods of any new innovation must be exercised as soon
as is practical to allow for the identification of problems and the refinement of
tasks and organization. 32 Similarly, experimentation with a diverse set of
approaches will allow for the identification of the most efficient operating
procedures and methodologies. 33 The establishment of selected measures of
effectiveness or pre/post audit analysis will allow for a general evaluation of the
use of the innovation as well as the most effective way of approaching that
change. 34
2 7 Rosen, "New Ways of War", p. 141.28 Davis, pp. 36-37.
29 Rosen, p. 136.
30 Davis, p.77.
31 Pickett, pp. 13 and 17.
32 Ibid, p.3.
33 Hone and Mandeles, p. 77.
34 Ibid, p. 79. Also Pickett, p. 11.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
The successful implementation of this fundamental change in the approach
and focus of US intelligence will involve a long term commitment to overcome the
various obstacles that presently stand in its way. While political, educational, and
budgetary constraints may hamper efforts to change the intelligence community,
the realization of the fundamental change in the strategic environment must serve
as an impetus for innovation. "Bringing innovations to fruition will often be
expensive.. .but initiating an innovation and bringing it to a point where it provides
a strategically useful option has been accomplished when money was tight." 35
Although the reeducation and refocusing of the American intelligence effort will
undoubtedly be a costly and time consuming commitment, the US must dedicate
itself to the implementation of this plan if it is to manage the inherent uncertainty
of international relations and continue its role as the world's sole remaining
superpower.
35 Rosen, Winning the Next War, p. 252.
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